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ABSTRACT 
ECONOMIC ESSAYS ON HEALTH AND LOCATION 
By 
JOSEPH ANTHONY GARUCCIO 
May, 2021 
Committee Chair: Dr. Charles Courtemanche 
Major Department: Economics 
This dissertation is composed of three chapters that focus on the effect of one’s 
environment on one’s health and healthcare decisions. Specifically, this work focuses on how 
various policies and physical environments affect one’s potential access to care, one’s probability 
of acquiring preventive care, and the spread of the novel coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19). In my 
first chapter, I examine if Medicaid expansions induced new physicians to locate closer to poor 
populations. I use precise physician location data and American Community Survey data at the 
census block group level to identify the extent to which the expansions induced new physicians to 
locate closer to poor populations. A goal of the Affordable Care Act and Medicaid expansions was 
to increase healthcare access for low-income adults. I show that new physicians in expansion states 
located increasingly closer to poor populations after expansion, arguably increasing their 
healthcare access.  
 In my second chapter, I estimate the effect increases in urban sprawl in metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSA) have on the probability individuals acquire timely preventive care. I make 
use of Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System data, an index of urban sprawl at the MSA 
level, and the 1947 Interstate Highway Construction Plan to estimate the effect of increased sprawl. 
   
In an instrumental variable design, I find that a standard deviation increase in sprawl lowers the 
probability that individuals have various important cancer screenings and are more likely to be 
obese. Such an increase also increases the probability of individuals obtaining flu shots. 
 In my third chapter, my coauthors and I estimate the effect social distancing policies had 
on reducing the growth rate of COVID-19. We make use of daily, county-level confirmed case 
and intervention data from Johns Hopkins University as well as state-level testing data to estimate 
the effect of four key social distancing policies. We make use of an event-study design to 
separately estimate the effect of shelter-in-place orders (SIPOs), bans on large gatherings, public 
school closures, and restaurant and entertainment venue closures. We find that SIPOs and the 
closure of restaurant and entertainment venues significantly reduced the growth rate. We found no 
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This body of work is comprised of three independent economic essays related to the effect 
one’s environment has on one’s health and healthcare decisions. The goal of this dissertation is to 
provide insight into the effects one’s physical and policy environment can have on one’s health. I 
aim to shed light on how state and local policy can influence one’s health and healthcare decisions 
as well as the effect urban environments can have on healthcare decisions. Specifically, I examine 
the impacts of Medicaid expansions on new physician locations, urban sprawl on preventive care 
use, and social distancing policies on the COVID-19 growth rate. 
 In my first chapter, I estimate the extent to which Medicaid expansions under the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) led new physicians to locate closer to poor populations. Gains in 
access to healthcare for low-income adults were a goal of the ACA. I approach access from a 
spatial perspective and estimate the change in the proportion of poor individuals per 1,000 
residents near new physician locations. The argument is, if new physicians locate closer to poor 
populations, then those populations experience an increase in healthcare access. I make use of 
precise physician location data and population data from the American Community Survey to 
examine the changes in populations that new physicians locate near due to Medicaid expansions. 
I find that within expansion states, new physicians located increasingly closer to poor populations 
from 2014 to 2016. I do not find, however, any evidence that new physicians elected to enter 
expansion states over non-expansion states and thereby reduce access in non-expansion states. 
This suggests an increase in access for poor populations in expansion states without an 
accompanying reduction for similar populations in non-expansion states.  
 In my second chapter, I estimate the effect increases in metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
urban sprawl has on preventive care use. Acquiring preventive care services can become more 
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inconvenient and costly as urban areas become more spread out, difficult to traverse, segregated 
along residential and commercial lines, and have their economic activity more dispersed. To 
examine this, I use preventive care use data from the 2012 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS) and a 2010 index of MSA level urban sprawl. I use the 1947 Highway 
Construction Plan to instrument for levels of sprawl and estimate the effect of sprawl on the 
probability of timely preventive care acquisition. I find that a one standard deviation increase in 
sprawl tends to reduce the probability of individuals acquiring important preventive care, 
particularly among cancer screening services. My results also suggest that greater sprawl increases 
the probability of acquiring a flu shot and being obese. 
 In my third chapter, my coauthors and I estimate the effect social distancing policies had 
on the novel coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) growth rate from March 1, 2020, to April 27, 2020. 
States and localities imposed various social distancing measures within this time frame to combat 
the spread of COVID-19 in the early stages of the pandemic. We used an event-study design to 
examine the reducing effects of shelter-in-place orders (SIPOs), bans on large gatherings, public 
school closures, and closures of restaurants and entertainment venues separately. We found 
significant evidence that SIPOs and closures of restaurants and entertainment venues reduced the 
COVID-19 growth rate. We found no significant evidence that either bans on large gatherings or 
public-school closures affected the COVID-19 growth rate. Our results suggest the more imposing 
social distancing measures had clear reducing effects. Alternatively, the results for gathering bans 






CHAPTER I: MEDICAID EXPANSIONS AND NEW PHYSICIAN LOCATIONS 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Among the primary goals of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was to 
create near-universal health insurance coverage in the United States (Gruber, 2011). The pursuit 
of this goal involved a combination of mandates, public insurance expansions, and subsidies for 
the purchase of private insurance. These various components were to work toward extending 
coverage among underserved and largely uninsured populations in the U.S. The various policies, 
implemented mostly in 2014, sought to improve “accessibility, affordability, and quality of care,” 
particularly among the very sick as well as uninsured, low-income adults (Obama, 2016).  
Historically, gaining health insurance has been perceived as gaining increased access to 
healthcare. This may come through a combination of facing a reduced price for healthcare services 
due to being insured and being perceived as a reliable payer by health care providers. All insurance 
types, however, may not be considered equally appealing by physicians as compensation rates 
vary, sometimes substantially, across insurance types (Berman et al., 2002, Zuckerman et al., 2012; 
2014; 2017). Such differences have been thought to historically limit access to health care for 
Medicaid enrollees, especially to physicians with established practices and patient rosters. 
Physicians, even if willing to see new Medicaid patients, may only be able to accept a 
limited number or provide them services at the cost of providing services to other patient types. 
This would mean a tradeoff of access between patients of different insurance types. Additionally, 
the location of physicians affects access. The further away a doctor is, the more difficult she is to 
see. If established physicians are time-constrained or inconvenient to reach, then it is important to 
understand how newly entering physicians respond to changes in public insurance coverage. If 
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physicians are unable or unwilling to make themselves more available to newly insured Medicaid 
enrollees, then the enrollees’ access to care may be far less than one would hope.  
There is relatively little causal research examining the supply-side response to the ACA 
and its effect on access. This paper’s primary contribution is to utilize rich, national data on 
physicians that are particularly well suited to studying this issue from a geographic perspective. I 
use difference-in-differences and event-study models to estimate the effect of Medicaid expansions 
on physician entrants per 100,000 state population and on the population under the federal poverty 
line (FPL) per 1,000 people near new physician locations. I use these two outcomes as spatial 
measures of changes in access. Physicians being drawn to expansion states could indicate either a 
desire to capture the pool of new customers or a hiring response from established practices facing 
increased demand for their services. It would also suggest a potential loss of access if those 
physicians would have served similar populations in non-expansion states. If new physicians are 
willing to locate closer to lower-income populations post-expansion within states, then those 
populations have arguably greater healthcare access.  
The advantages of the data I use, which come from the National Plan and Provider 
Enumeration System (NPPES), are the ability to precisely locate physicians and to focus 
exclusively on gross entry. The latter advantage is an improvement over the use of public data 
which provides net counts of physicians that combines new entrants with recent exits and makes 
disentangling policy effects on either type difficult. I focus on the location decisions of post-
residency (i.e. new) physicians across and within state lines.  
In general, I do not find evidence that Medicaid expansions impacted new entrants per 
100,000 state population among newly entering physicians. Rather, I find that doctors choose to 
locate closer to low-income populations within expansion states. Pre-treatment coefficient 
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estimates from event study regressions generally support a causal interpretation of the results. 
Taken together, these results suggest an increase in access for low-income adult populations in 
expansion states that did not come at the expense of non-expansion states. 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
ACA Medicaid Expansion 
With the implementation of the ACA, there were significant gains in health insurance for 
the previously uninsured (Courtemanche et al., 2017; Frean et al., 2017; Courtemanche et al., 
2018a; Courtemanche et al., 2018b) and expansions of public health insurance led to increases in 
health care demand and utilization (Baicker et al., 2013; Ghosh et al., 2017; Finkelstein et al., 
2012; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012; Miller, 2012a; Miller, 2012b; Simon et al., 2017; Wherry and 
Miller, 2016). Simon et al. (2017) found increases in the probability that poor adults had a personal 
physician due to Medicaid expansions. Ghosh et al.’s (2017) findings suggest greater prescription 
drug access for chronic conditions among new Medicaid enrollees. These findings as well as others 
point toward greater access to healthcare for the newly insured (Rhodes et al., 2017; Mazurenko 
et al., 2017; Antonisse et al., 2018). The American Medical Association (AMA) reported 
statistically significant increases in Medicaid patients as a share of average physicians’ patient mix 
in expansion states in its Physician Practice Benchmark Surveys (Unlisted Staff Writer, 2017). 
Neprash et al. (2018), however, found little to no increase in physician Medicaid participation due 
to the Medicaid expansions and that Medicaid patients remained concentrated among relatively 
few physicians. Additionally, mixed positive and null findings of the expansions’ effect on 
preventive care usage suggest some limitations on access gains (Finkelstein et al., 2012; 
Courtemanche et al. 2018b). 
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Other research and a survey of Michigan doctors by the University of Michigan suggests 
that the ACA insurance expansions led to longer initial wait times (Benitez et al., 2019) and less 
time spent by physicians with patients (Garthwaite, 2012; Slowery et al., 2018). Rhodes et al. 
(2017), however, did find wait time for appointments for the privately insured to be stable across 
10 states in mid-2014 despite increased Medicaid enrollment. This suggests that established 
physicians were not at their capacity constraints at this time, the tradeoff was being made with 
Medicare patients, or that the tradeoff was in time spent with patients. Tipirneni et al.’s (2019) 
post-Medicaid expansion survey of Michigan primary care providers (PCPs), however, did list 
capacity as the most commonly reported factor influencing the acceptance of new Medicaid 
patients. Those PCPs accepting new Medicaid patients tended to be female, minorities, 
nonphysician providers, specialized in internal medicine, paid by salary, or working in practices 
with Medicaid-predominant payer mixes (Tipirneni et al., 2019). Broadly, the evidence suggests 
that there were tradeoffs in access made by time-constrained physicians. Such constraints and the 
lack of a substantial change in Medicaid participation by practicing physicians means that the 
decisions of newly entering physicians, who are less location-constrained than established 
physicians, could be vital to ensuring access for newly insured populations.  
On June 28, 2012, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the expansion of Medicaid 
programs was at the discretion of the states (KFF, 2012). This introduced the potential for 
significant variation in state expansion decisions. Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia 
expanded Medicaid in 2014.  However, the ACA allowed states to expand Medicaid before and 
after 2014 and multiple states did so to some degree (Courtemanche et al., 2017). As noted earlier, 
the expansions of public insurance brought significant gains in insurance coverage. According to 
the Kaiser Family Foundation, before the implementation of the ACA, Medicaid and the 
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Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) had just over 56.8 million enrollees across the United 
States, and by the end of 2016, this number had swelled to just under 75 million (KFF, 2020).  
The ACA not only generated a large increase in new enrollment via state Medicaid 
expansions but also tried to incentivize physicians to be more willing to accept Medicaid enrollees. 
The federal government fully sponsored a notable increase in Medicaid compensation for 146 
primary care services (Maclean et al., 2018). Physicians who specialized in primary care or for 
whom these services constituted a certain majority percentage of the services they provided 
qualified for the increased compensation. This “fee bump” was a temporary, nationwide measure 
lasting for the years 2013 and 2014. The federal government ultimately did not elect to continue 
paying for this fee increase, and funding for it ended after December 2014 with an estimated cost 
between 7 to 12 billion dollars (Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission, 2015). As 
of July 2016, 19 states had decided to continue funding the fee increase fully or partially or extend 
it to other specialties beyond primary care (Zuckerman et al., 2017).  
Some evidence suggests that the fee bump increased access to healthcare (Polsky et al., 
2015; MACPAC, 2015; Rhodes et al., 2017; Alexander and Schnell, 2017), though other research 
found little change in physicians’ acceptance of Medicaid (Decker, 2016; 2018). This picture is 
one of increased access for Medicaid enrollees among physicians who already participated in 
Medicaid (Neprash, 2018; Tipirneni 2019), with the primary care fee bump providing little 
incentive for additional participation (Decker, 2016; 2018). This could lead to participating 
providers hiring more physicians to address the additional demand which would be faced 
disproportionately by them. Additionally, while established physicians may not be willing to 
accept the costs of participating in Medicaid (Timbie et al., 2017), newly entering physicians may 
be drawn to Medicaid as an arena in which there is less established provider competition. 
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Zukerman and Goin (2012) show Medicaid-Medicare compensation ratios for various 
medical services. A large majority of Medicaid programs compensate physicians less than 
Medicare for their services and compensate primary care and other specialty services at different 
relative rates. Excluding Tennessee, 34 of 49 states’ fee-for-service Medicaid programs 
compensated other, non-obstetric services relatively higher than primary care. Among the other 
states, 12 compensated primary care services relatively higher than other services, and four 
compensated them at an equal ratio. These ratios do not reveal what specialties are paid more; 
however, they show how close compensation for one insurance type is to another for various 
services. All else equal, this shows if the two insurance types are close or remote substitutes in 
compensation.  
Similar data from 2016 showed that between 26 and 30 states fee-for-service programs 
compensated other, non-obstetric services relatively higher (KFF 2016). The range arises from 
certain states electing to continue the primary care fee bump in some fashion. These differences 
suggest that primary care physicians may find new Medicaid enrollees less appealing than other 
specialists during the sample period from 2011 to 2016. Primary care physicians may also face 
greater competition from non-physician providers such as nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants who can provide many of the same basic services (Van Vleet and Paradise 2015). To 
explore potential response differences, I perform a subsample analysis for primary care physicians 
and other specialists. 
Existing Literature 
There is a host of literature examining the location decisions of physicians. The broad 
finding in this literature is that physician supply tends to respond to policy changes. Research 
focusing on physician responses to tort reform, such as the capping of non-economic damages for 
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malpractice, finds that the implementation of these caps increases physician supply, particularly 
in specialties most at risk of malpractice claims (Kessler, 2005; Klick and Stratmann, 2007; Matsa, 
2007; Chou and Lo Sasso, 2009;  Malani and Reif, 2015; Pesko et al., 2017; Chatterji et al., 2018). 
However, there are dissenting opinions that find no effect of malpractice reform on supply (Paik 
et al., 2016; Hyman et al., 2015). Some research suggests that the riskiest physicians in states may 
sort undesirably into neighboring reform states (Leiber, 2014).  
Research focusing on physicians’ urban-rural decisions finds that student loan forgiveness 
programs increase the supply of physicians in rural counties (Kulka and McWeeny, 2017; 
Falcetone, 2017). Within this literature, however, is evidence that physicians are somewhat 
resistant to moving across state lines. Falcetone (2017) found that physicians prefer to locate near 
their place of residency and relays the fact that 54 percent of physicians remain in their state of 
residency for their first job. Taken together these literatures motivate my investigation of the effect 
of the ACA Medicaid expansion on physician location decisions. On one hand, physicians seem 
to be responsive to policy changes when it comes to location decisions. On the other hand, the 
seeming distaste of physicians for Medicaid implies that incentives for relocating with respect to 
this specific policy may not be particularly strong. Additionally, since physicians have a preference 
for remaining within their state of residency, it is important to examine within-state location 
decisions, not just cross-state decisions.  
The Pathway to Becoming a Physician 
 The first step for future physicians after medical school is their residency training. 
Residency lengths vary among specialties and can be as short as 3 years or as long as 7 years. If a 
physician wants to sub-specialize, then they will need to apply for and accept sub-specialty training 
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in what is called a fellowship. Most fellowships are an additional 1 to 2 years, however, some may 
be 3 or 4 more years.1  
 To practice medicine independently, physicians in the U.S. must acquire a medical license 
for their specialty in the state in which they practice. While medical licensure for physicians occurs 
at the state level, there is a required national exam component. The other requirements can vary 
but all states require applicants to have some amount of post-graduate training (residency), pass 
their national exams, provide information about malpractice suits, and pay a fee to the state for 
initial licensure and license renewal (Kocher, 2014). When a physician must acquire a license 
varies. California requires licensure during residency; however, other states have not codified such 
a requirement. In Georgia, at least some residents are given a grace period at the end of residency 
to pursue licensure (Albano 2020). Following licensure, physicians pursue board certification. 
Physicians cannot become board certified before completing residency. Residents typically search 
for their first post-residency job during their final year of residency and most will start in their new 
position mere weeks after completing their residency training (Darves, 2014). As residency years 
typically end in June, this suggests there are few opportunities to adapt location decisions in the 
six months leading up to the bulk of Medicaid expansions which occur in January. 
1.3 DATA 
Sources and Outcome Construction 
 I ask two questions in my analysis. The first is, did the Medicaid expansions change the 
level of new physician entry in expansion states relative to non-expansion states? The second is, 
did the Medicaid expansions induce new physicians to locate er to poor populations? To address 
 
1 See: https://education.uwmedicine.org/pages/specialties-subspecialties/ 
11 
 
the first question, I construct a count of new physicians per 100,000 state population from a sample 
of new physicians.  This sample was extracted from the monthly publications of the National Plan 
and Provider Enumeration System (NPPES), which contains the near universe of physicians, from 
April 2011 to December 2016.2  
To bill insurance and transmit health information protected under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), physicians in the US were required to obtain a unique 
numeric identifier known as a national provider identifier (NPI) by May 23, 2008. Registration has 
no monetary cost and is compulsory for insurance reimbursement. Therefore, the NPI registry 
contains the near universe of licensed physicians and other entities that directly bill insurance or 
transmit protected data. Individuals and organizations have separate NPIs that allow for unique 
identification. In 2013, the CMS began requiring the use of an NPI when writing prescriptions, 
making it even more difficult for a physician to avoid having one.  
Each month of NPPES data contains physicians’ unique identifier, their primary practice 
location at the street level, and their current, precise specialty (taxonomy code). This data does not 
contain demographic nor other individual information outside of sex and sole proprietor status. By 
CMS guidelines, resident physicians are only to change their taxonomy code from that of a student 
trainee to that of a physician after they are licensed. Therefore, those with physician taxonomy 
codes in the NPPES represent the near universe of licensed physicians. I observe the point of 
licensure for those who make this change during my sample period; however, the completion of 
residency is not provided. Figure 1. shows the national level count of licensed allopathic and 
osteopathic physicians observed in this data. The December 2016 count of these physicians in 
 
2 January to March of 2011 was not available from the data source and May 2013 was also missing. 
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Figure 1 is just over 908,000. For contrast, Young et al. (2017) counted 953,695 allopathic and 
osteopathic physicians by the end of 2016 using data from the Federation of State Medical Boards. 
My count makes up over 95% of the physician count found by Young et al. (2017). The doctors 
used in my analysis also include podiatrists and optometrists. Their inclusion brings the count of 
doctors to just over 978,000 by the end of 2016.  
FIGURE 1: COUNT OF ALLOPATHIC AND OSTEOPATHIC PHYSICIANS IN NPPES 
Note: May 2013 is missing from my dataset. 
 Given that licensure can occur during residency, the date of licensure cannot reliably be 
used to identify new physician entry. To identify the date of entry, I follow Falcetone (2017) and 
utilize the CMS’s Medicare Physician Compare. Medicare Physician Compare provides 
information on physicians and medical groups that participate in Medicare. While this data set 
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does not contain all physicians, it does contain participating physicians’ NPI and their year of 
graduation from medical school. The Year of entry can, therefore, be identified by adding the years 
of required training for a specialty to the year of graduation. Employing this method, I constructed 
my sample’s annual state-level count of entering physicians per 100,000 state population. I 
aggregate entries to the year level as sparsely populated states do not always have a physician enter 
every month. As a precaution, I examined my prospective entrants years later in the NPPES’ 
publication for June of 2020. If an individual identified as a potential entrant did not have a 
physician’s taxonomy code in 2020 or became a sub-specialist after my sample period, then I 
removed them from my sample. This avoids conflating post-training entrants with those who did 
not remain a physician or did not complete their fellowship training during the sample period. This 
removed less than 4.5 percent of potential entrants. 
  To examine if the Medicaid expansions induced doctors to locate closer to poor 
populations, I estimate the number of individuals under the federal poverty line (FPL) per 1000 
population residing within twenty, ten, and five miles of a new entrant’s location. The maximum 
size of this radius comes from research in the states of Kentucky and Washington. One paper found 
that about 82% of patients traveled less than 20 miles for their healthcare visit (Cashion et al., 
2013). The other found that surveyed adults would be willing to travel just over 20 miles on 
average for routine care, though average trips at the time were considerably shorter (Yin, 2013). 
 I infer the general population and those under the federal poverty line near physician 
locations using American Community Survey (ACS) data at the census block group level; which 
is the lowest level geography publicly available. I utilize the five-year files for the ACS, which are 
one percent national samples for each year and the only files which publish census block group 
data.  I assume the data best represents the middle year of each five-year period from 2009-2018.  
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There is limited information offered at the census block group level given that some groups 
have very small population sizes. I infer the number of individuals under the FPL living in each 
block group using block group population, number of households in each block group, and the 
number of households in various income categories. Taking the average household size and 
assuming households are uniformly distributed within income categories, I estimate the population 
under or at the poverty line in each block group. Figure 2. plots the annual poverty rate I infer 
alongside that reported by the Census Bureau using Current Population Survey’s (CPS) data 
(Semega et al., 2017).  
FIGURE 2: INFERRED PERCENT IN POVERTY
 
My inferred percentage is consistently about one percentage point higher than the CPS but 
tracks it very well. Assuming each census block group’s population lives in its centroid, I construct 
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the number of individuals under the federal poverty line per 1000 population living within twenty, 
ten, and five miles of each entering physician’s location. Table 1. displays a table of summary 
statistics for the aggregate state and individual level outcomes by pre and post-expansion periods. 
TABLE 1: CHAPTER I SUMMARY STATISTICS 





All Doctors 2.60 2.77 
Primary Care 1.10 1.16 
Other Specialties 1.50 1.60 
   






Within 20 Miles   
All Doctors           167.04           154.40 
Primary Care 167.71 155.86 
Other Specialties 166.57 153.39 
Within 10 Miles   
All Doctors           184.75           169.85 
Primary Care 185.73 171.11 
Other Specialties 184.07 168.99 
Within 5 Miles   
All Doctors           204.02           188.13 
Primary Care 208.38 190.83 
Other Specialties 200.99 186.27 
   
Note: 2011 is excluded here as the physician data begins in April of that year. Its inclusion would reduce the pre-period state 
entry means due to this. For consistency, 2011 is excluded in the doctor level means as well. 
Data Limitations 
 There are limitations to using Medicare Physician Compare to identify entry and the 
NPPES’s primary practice location for physicians. Pediatricians, returning physicians, and 
foreign-born physicians are likely underrepresented in my sample. Pediatricians do not tend to 
participate in Medicare and relatively few appear in the Physician Compare data. Physicians who 
return from an extended break from practice or who are foreign-born enter on non-traditional 
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timelines. Both types require additional training to be licensed and basing entry on graduation year 
likely excludes the majority of these physicians. The Medicaid expansions were designed, 
however, to increase healthcare access for poor adults and the sample’s lack of pediatricians is less 
concerning than it might be in other circumstances. I exclude those that do appear in Physician 
Compare from my sample as my concern is about poor adult access to care. 
The effect of omitting returning physicians is ambiguous as there is little research on 
returning physicians. It has been estimated that around 10,000 physicians could return to practice 
each year; however, there is little information on how many do return and in what specialties 
(AMA Reentry Fact Sheet, 2011).3 The omission of foreign-born physicians, on the other hand, 
likely leads to conservative results. Around twenty-five percent of physicians practicing in the US 
have medical degrees from foreign countries, and evidence suggests that most of these physicians 
are not US citizens (AIC, 2018). This report finds that foreign-trained physicians constitute nearly 
one-third of doctors practicing in areas where at least 30 percent of the population are at the federal 
poverty level. This suggests the omission of these doctors’ location choices will lead to understated 
levels of low-income individuals near entering physician locations. 
 The benefit of having a precise location for each physician’s primary practice location is 
limited by the fact that physicians may practice at multiple locations. The NPPES does not track 
nor require physicians to report all locations of practice. The effect this may have is ambiguous 
and depends on where else physicians may practice. If a physician’s additional practice locations 
are in higher-income areas, then results implying increased access for low-income populations 
would be overstated. A similar argument could be made for an understated or unaffected result. 
 
3 The year is not listed on the sheet, however another source mentions that the study providing this number is from 
2011, see: https://khn.org/news/for-doctors-who-take-a-break-from-practice-coming-back-can-be-tough/ 
Last accessed: 7/31/2020 
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There is not an obvious means to address this limitation and I rely on the assumption that the 
majority of each physician’s time is spent at their primary practice location.  
1.4 METHODS 
I employ difference-in-differences (DiD) and event-study specifications in both my cross 
and within-state choice analyses. The examination of cross-state location choices determines if the 
Medicaid expansions induced differential sorting. If the composition of state entrants changed after 
expansions, then the interpretation of within-state results needs to acknowledge this change. My 
preferred specification uses only the 40 states which expanded in January 2014 or did not expand 
before 2017. I exclude those states which expanded earlier or later in my sample period. I do not 
have pre-expansion data for early expansion states. My sample period from April 2011 to 
December 2016 and I cannot examine any response to these early expansions. Further, the late 
expansion states have long pre-expansion periods and short post-expansion periods (one as short 
as six months). This introduces potentially unwanted variation in pre and post-expansion results 
due to changes in number and type of contributing states. There is a growing literature that 
expresses concerns about the legitimacy of event-study results and pre-trend tests when the timing 
of treatment is heterogeneous (Sun and Abraham 2020). My preferred specification avoids this 
concern and creates balance in the periods before and after expansion supporting a more causal 
interpretation of results. My cross-state decision DiD specification is as follows 
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠_𝑃𝑒𝑟_100𝐾_𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝝀 + 𝝉𝑡 + 𝜸𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠_𝑃𝑒𝑟_100𝐾_𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the count of all entering physicians or a specific group of 
physicians in state i in year t per 100,000 state population, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 is an indicator equal 
to 1 if state i has expanded its Medicaid program in year t or years prior and 0 otherwise. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a 
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vector of state-level controls4 for state i in year t, 𝝉𝑡 and  𝜸𝑖are year and state fixed effects 
respectively, and µ𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
 The event study specification closely resembles equation (1) and is as follows  
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑟 100𝐾 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ (𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑘 x 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘)𝝓 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝝀 + 𝝉𝑡 + 𝜸𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑡       (2) 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖 is an indicator equal to 1 if state i expanded Medicaid in January of 2014. Yeark 
is an indicator for a given year such that k ϵ {2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016}, leaving 2013 as the 
comparison year.  
 My within-state decision specification is very similar to that of my cross-state and is as 
follows 
𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑃𝐿 𝑃𝑒𝑟 1000 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑡 + 𝑿𝒌𝒕𝝀 + 𝛿1𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 + 𝝉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜸𝑗𝑘   +  𝜺𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡          (3) 
Where 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑃𝐿 𝑃𝑒𝑟 1000 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 is the population under the federal poverty 
line per 1000 population living within 20, 10, or 5 miles of doctor i of type j in state k in year t. 
𝑿𝒌𝒕 remains a vector of state-level controls, femaleijkt indicates if the entrant is female, the fixed 
effects are now year by doctor type (primary care, surgery, and other specialties) and state by 
doctor type respectively.  
 The event study specification for states which expanded in 2014 is as follows 
 
4 These controls include state-level means of race, education, insured levels, income, and population. Additionally, I 




𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑃𝐿 𝑃𝑒𝑟 250 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ (𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑘 x 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘)𝝅 +
                                                                                        𝑿𝒌𝒕𝝀 + 𝒁𝒊𝒕𝜹 + 𝝉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜸𝑗𝑘 + 𝜺𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡      (4) 
where the year before expansion is again used as the reference year. 
1.5 RESULTS 
Results 
 Table 2 displays the difference-in-differences estimates for my preferred cross-state 
decision specification. Figure 3 displays the cross-state event study for all physician types, primary 
care, and other specialties. Tables for these event studies can be found in Appendix A in Table 
A.1. I find little evidence that the Medicaid expansions induced changes in physician entries per 
100,000 state population. The 95 percent confidence intervals for the difference-in-differences 
results, however, do not rule out potentially meaningful effects. The interval for all physician types 
includes effects ranging from a 13.7 percent decrease in physicians entering expansion states to an 
11.1 percent increase. The event-study results in Figure 3 also do not suggest meaningful changes 
in the state-level entry for any doctor type, however, the possibility of such changes cannot be 
entirely ruled out. 
Table 3 shows the difference-in-differences estimates for my preferred within-state 
specification. Figure 4 displays the within-state event studies for radii of twenty, ten, and five miles 
respectively. The table of these results can be found in Appendix B, Table A.2. As the radius 
tightens around those living nearest physicians, a clear pattern emerges. I find significant evidence 
that all physician types chose to locate closer to poor populations in expansion states. The five-
mile radius results for all physician types suggest the population under the federal poverty line per 
1,000 residents near new physician locations increased by 3.6 percent relative to the pre-expansion 
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mean in the first year of expansion, 4.9 percent in the second year, and 7.9 percent in the third 
year. Figure 5 displays the sub-sample event studies for primary care and other specialties. The 
results for primary care are insignificant in the first two years but suggest an increase of 7.3 percent 
in the third year. The results for the other specialties suggest increases of 4.3 percent in the first 
year, 4.9 percent in the second, and 8.3 percent in the third. These results imply that newly entering 
physicians located increasingly closer to poor populations in expansion states over time.  
TABLE 2: CROSS-STATE DID - ENTRANTS PER 100K STATE POPULATION 
Variables All Doctors Primary Care Other Specialties 
Medicaid Expansion -0.0339 -0.0348 0.0010 
 (0.1597) (0.0983) (0.0930) 
    
State FE x x x 
Year FE x x x 
Observations 240 240 240 
Note: The outcome of interest is the state-level count of new entries per 100,000 state population. Other controls include state-level 
demographics, education, unemployment, indicators for malpractice reform and if primary care fee bump was kept, and state and 


















Figures 6, and 7 examine the sensitivity of results to the exclusion of states by expansion 
timing. They explore the potential concern that excluding populous states like California, in which 
many physicians begin practice, may significantly influence results. Excluding the early and late 
expanding states reduced the sample by nearly 9,000 entrants which is almost 25 percent of all 
entrants in the sample. Just over 3,000 of those excluded entrants started practice in California. 
Figure 6 displays three event studies for all physician types which include the addition of early 
expanding states to the preferred set, of later expanding states, and the use of all states. Consistent 
with the preferred set, the inclusion of early expanders, late expanders, or all states in the cross-
state analysis does not result in any statistically significant findings. This suggests that cross-state 
results are not driven by state exclusions. 
Figure 7 displays similar event studies for the within-state analysis. The within-state results 
are largely robust to the inclusion of early and late expansion states. Following Courtemanche et 
al. (2017) I assume that the full expansion for early expansion states occurred in January of 2014. 
Figure 7 displays the five-mile, event-study results for all doctor types with the inclusion of early 
expanders, late expanders, all states, and all states except Michigan. The inclusion of early 
expansion states does little to change the post-expansion results, however, a significant pre-trend 
appears in 2011. This trend does not persist in 2012 but could suggest a response to early 






TABLE 3: WITHIN-STATE DID 
Panel 1. 5 Mile Radius 
All Docs  
(5 mi.) 
Primary Care  
(5 mi.) 
Other. Spec. 
 (5 mi.) 
Medicaid Expansion 6.5248** 4.6286 8.6457* 
 (2.1100) (4.7646) (3.4059) 
    
Year FE  x x 
State FE  x x 
Year x Doctor Type FE x   
State x Doctor Type FE x   
Observations 30243 12353 17890 
    
Panel 2. 10 Mile Radius 
All Docs  
(10 mi.) 
Primary Care  
(10 mi.) 
Other. Spec.  
(10 mi.) 
Medicaid Expansion 3.1119+ -0.4109 5.9858** 
 (1.6557) (3.8391) (1.7873) 
    
Year FE  x x 
State FE  x x 
Year x Doctor Type FE x   
State x Doctor Type FE x   
Observations 30254 12360 17894 
    
Panel 3. 20 Mile Radius 
All Docs 
 (20 mi.) 
Primary Care 
(20 mi.) 
Other. Spec.  
(20 mi.) 
Medicaid Expansion 1.8718 0.2873 3.1118+ 
 (1.9714) (3.1234) (1.7254) 
    
Year FE  x x 
State FE  x x 
Year x Doctor Type FE x   
State x Doctor Type FE x   
Observations 30255 12361 17894 
Note: The outcome of interest is the population under the federal poverty line per 1000 population living within 20, 10, and 5 miles 
of newly entering physicians. Other controls include state-level demographics, education, unemployment, indicators for 
malpractice reform and if primary care fee bump was kept, and state by physician type and year by physician type fixed effects. 






FIGURE 3: CROSS-STATE EVENT STUDY – ENTRIES PER 100K POPULATION 
 
Note: The outcome of interest is the state-level count of new entries per 100,000 state population. Explanatory variables of interest 
are interactions between Medicaid expansion status and year. Other controls include state-level demographics, education, 
unemployment, indicators for malpractice reform, and if primary care fee bump was kept, and state and year fixed effects. 2013 is 




FIGURE 4: WITHIN-STATE EVENT STUDY: 20, 10, AND 5 MILE RADIUS 
 
 
Note: The outcome of interest is the population under the federal poverty line per 1000 population living within 20, 10, and 5 miles 
of newly entering physicians. Explanatory variables of interest are interactions between Medicaid expansion status and year. Other 
controls include state-level demographics, education, unemployment, indicators for malpractice reform, and if primary care fee 
bump was kept, and state by doctor group (primary care or other specialists) and year by doctor group type fixed effects. 2013 is 
the comparison year and graphs display 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. 
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FIGURE 5: SUB-SAMPLE ANALYSIS – PRIMARY CARE AND OTHER SPECIALISTS 
 
Note: The outcome of interest is the population under the federal poverty line per 1000 population living within 5 miles of newly 
entering physicians. Explanatory variables of interest are interactions between Medicaid expansion status and year. Other controls 
include state-level demographics, education, unemployment, indicators for malpractice reform, and if primary care fee bump was 
kept, and state by doctor group (primary care or other specialists) and year by doctor group type fixed effects. 2013 is the 
comparison year and graphs display 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. 
The inclusion of late expansion states introduces more heterogenous timing in expansions 
and produces noisier results. The results are similar to my preferred results for those years shared 
by all included states (three years prior through the year of expansion). In the shared periods, there 
are no significant pre-trends and there are significant increases in the year of expansion. The results 
for the subsequent expansion years are suggestive of increases but are insignificant. The use of all 
states presents a similar story, suggesting that the noisiness of post-expansion results is driven by 
the inclusion of late-expanding states. The exclusion of Michigan, which expanded in April of 
2014, addresses this lack of precision and provides results similar to my preferred specification. 
While it is reassuring that statistical imprecision is not systemic to all late expanding states, the 




FIGURE 6: CROSS-STATE EVENT STUDIES – VARYING STATE INCLUSIONS 
 
 
Note: The outcome of interest is the state-level count of new entries per 100,000 state population. Explanatory variables of interest 
are interactions between Medicaid expansion status years relative to expansion. For early expansion states, January of 2014 is 
assumed to be the official expansion date. Other controls include state-level demographics, education, unemployment, indicators 
for malpractice reform, and if primary care fee bump was kept, and state and year fixed effects. 2013 is the comparison year and 
graphs display 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level.  
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FIGURE 7: WITHIN-STATE EVENT STUDIES – VARYING STATE INCLUSIONS 
 
Note: The outcome of interest is the population under the federal poverty line per 1000 population living within 5 miles of newly 
entering physicians. Explanatory variables of interest are interactions between Medicaid expansion status and year. Other controls 
include state-level demographics, education, unemployment, indicators for malpractice reform, and if primary care fee bump was 
kept, and state by doctor group (primary care or other specialists) and year by doctor group type fixed effects. 2013 is the 
comparison year and graphs display 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. 
 
1.6 DISCUSSION 
My findings suggest healthcare access increased for low-income populations within 
expansion states without reducing access in non-expansion states. The broad ACA literature 
suggests access increased to those physicians already participating in Medicaid but physician 
participation did not change. This places increased importance on new physician decisions. If 
Medicaid expansions had induced new physicians to enter expansion states over non-expansion 
states, then it likely would have been those predisposed to serving Medicaid patients. This could 
have led to undesirable access tradeoffs among low-income populations. In such a case, the gain 
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in the probability of low-income adults in expansion states having a personal physician (Simon et 
al., 2017), might have come at the expense of similar populations in non-expansion states. Finding 
only within-state effects suggests expansion states increased access without negatively impacting 
their non-expansion neighbors. Therefore, findings of increased prescription drug access for 
chronic conditions (Ghosh et al., 2017) would not be diminished by accompanying access tradeoffs 
in non-expansion states.  
I find somewhat smaller and less precise estimates for primary care physicians relative to 
other specialists. This could be due to a somewhat smaller sample or to differences in relative 
compensation rates. For a majority of states non-primary care, non-obstetric services are 
compensated at a higher relative rate (Zukerman and Goin 2012; KFF 2016). The weaker results 
among newly entering primary care physicians could be due to a relatively weaker financial 
incentive to serve Medicaid enrollees. It could also be due to greater competition for these 
populations from non-physician PCPs (Tiperneni et al. 2019). 
I find physicians’ location decisions are responsive to changes in Medicaid, but only within 
their chosen state of practice. This may be because physicians prefer to stay within their state of 
residency (Falcetone, 2017) and the relatively low compensation offered by Medicaid was unable 
to overcome this preference (Zuckerman et al.; 2012, 2014, 2017). The malpractice reform 
literature finds state-level effects on physician supply, sometimes only for at-risk specialties, using 
area-level counts or post-residency decisions from a single state (Chatterji et al., 2018). My 
sample, while unlikely to be representative, is national and uses only entrants. This reduces the 
risk of results being influenced by physician exit or being highly localized. Figure 1 shows a 
declining poverty rate in the US from 2014 to 2016 for both my inferred rate and the CPS measure. 
This suggests my results are not driven by changes in poverty but by changes in location decisions. 
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 This work contributes to a sparse literature on supply-side responses to the ACA and the 
wider literature on physician location decisions. My results support demand-side research 
suggesting increased healthcare access. They imply the supply-side response was to reallocate 
entrants within states to accommodate the increased demand from expanded Medicaid. It also 
demonstrates a need for additional supply-side research as estimates of access changes require a 
fuller understanding of both supply and demand responses.  
 This paper brings a novel, national dataset to bear on an underexplored area of research 
and indicates valuable future work to be done. My results are suggestive of increased access but 
do not address physician persistence in their post-residency location. If physicians remain in their 
post-residency location for extended periods, then my results suggest increasing access over time 
for low-income populations. However, if they move on quickly to serve high-income areas and are 
merely being replaced by new entrants, then access increased in a more limited fashion.  
  My work is policy informative and provides insight into the effect of Medicaid expansions. 
However, a limitation is that it does not comment on the cost-effectiveness of increases in access. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the costs and benefits of changes in access. 
Nevertheless, research on insurance expansions in the US remains relevant as the national debate 
on the form health insurance and healthcare should take is ongoing. My work suggests that the 
observed gains in access in expansion states came in the most preferred form. Expansion states 
increased healthcare access for low-income populations without evidence of damaging their non-
expansion neighbors. While I do not suggest that physicians will never be induced to locate across 
state lines by changes in Medicaid policy, my results suggest that Medicaid policy may be a means 
of addressing access disparities within states without damaging one’s neighbors. Policy has 
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changed with administrations over time and is likely to change again in the future. This creates a 
need for continued, causal research to inform the decisions of policymakers. 
CHAPTER II: URBAN SPRAWL AND PREVENTIVE CARE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Common aspects of the United States’ metropolitan areas that affect their populations, 
affect a majority of the nation as urban areas contain nearly eighty percent of the country’s 
population (U.S. Census Bureau 2016). As urban areas expand, so too do the activities performed 
in environments almost entirely manmade. The layout of cities’ systems of roads, the location of 
businesses and residences, the existence and routes of public transportation, and all other amenities 
come together to give an urban area its form. Given the population living within urban areas, 
understanding their form’s influence on residents’ health, labor markets, socioeconomic 
distributions, and other outcomes are of interest to researchers and policymakers. This work 
contributes to the urban form and health-related research by estimating the impact of urban sprawl 
on the probability one obtains certain, recommended preventive care services.  
 As a city expands and shopping centers, subdivisions, commercial centers, and other types 
of development are built, they are often constructed with their own parking lots, parking structures, 
driveways, lawns, offices, living space, and more paved roads and black-topped areas. The added 
space used for living, working, and entertaining tends to reduce the population per given square 
unit of distance in an area. If the urban form is significantly spread out, then it is often called 
sprawling.  In a broad sense, urban sprawl can be thought of as “the process in which the spread 
of development across the landscape far outpaces population growth” (Ewing et al 2014). In this 
case, people and places are further apart and travel between locations may require additional time 
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and costs on average. The degrees to which metropolitan areas are traversable, allocated for 
particular uses, have concentrated economic centers, and populations are distributed across space 
provide the common measures of sprawl. How traversable (grid-like) a metropolitan area may be 
is also used as a measure of sprawl, though, perhaps less commonly than the other three.   
In areas that are sprawled, one’s ability to travel by other means than by car may become 
more inhibited and inconvenient. People who live in cities and depend on public transportation 
may not be offered a route that takes them to suburban areas where their doctor may be located or 
they may find that a bus or train traveling to that area runs infrequently. Even if the travel time 
remains unchanged to a preferred health facility's location, switching from taking the train to a car 
can impose higher costs.  Among other scenarios, higher costs arise when an equidistant train trip 
is cheaper than driving, when one does not own a car and must hire one, or when one has purchased 
an unlimited train pass and using a car is an additive cost. As costs and inconvenience rise, 
individuals may forgo certain trips including those for medical services that do not seem urgent. 
Ewing et al. (2014) found that urban sprawl is associated with greater amounts of driving, 
pollution, vehicle accidents, and reduced use of alternatives to driving such as walking. Other 
research found that reduced population and housing density are correlated with increased driving 
times to primary care providers in Orlando (Bejleri et al. 2016). This suggests that sprawl likely 
imposes higher average travel costs. The question this paper asks is, does this greater urban sprawl 
decrease the probability of acquiring preventive care? 
2.2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Preventive care may be the area of medical care expected to respond most strongly to 
sprawl levels. Preventive care may be thought of as optional care by an average individual. These 
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are services that people receive proactively while feeling healthy to head off potential, future health 
problems and remain healthy. These services are unlikely to be viewed as being as much of a 
necessity when compared to services that one seeks for an illness. Their probability of use may, 
therefore, be more sensitive to how burdensome a service is to acquire. Sprawl’s expected effect 
on medical care usage when one is ill is more ambiguous. On one hand, it seems plausible for 
increased inconvenience to reduce the usage of care for prevention and the treatment of illness. On 
the other hand, care for illnesses may be utilized more if there is a decline in preventive care usage 
that translates into a higher rate of manifested illnesses requiring treatment. For this reason, I focus 
on preventive care, as it is plausibly affected in only a single direction.  
The decision to forgo services rests on how preventive care is valued relative to its cost of 
acquisition. The value of preventive care can be discussed from two points of view. One point of 
view evaluates preventive care in terms of cost-effectiveness (Maciosek, 2006; Maciosek 2017). 
From this perspective, the value of a given service is based on whether the estimated cost of the 
prevention is cheaper than treating the illness itself. This is an important consideration for those 
who bear the cost of medical bills such as health insurers. This manner for valuating preventive 
care, however, is unlikely to be shared by individuals. Grossman (1972) relates that there is value 
in and of one’s health and, to that extent, there is value in investing to improve or maintain one’s 
health. All other things equal, people prefer to be well rather than ill, which necessitates a value 
difference.  Pure cost-effectiveness at the individual level disregards the value of one’s health in 
the well and sick state. If preventive treatment is cost-neutral, people are unlikely to be indifferent 




The urban form for metropolitan residents influences the costs they face in obtaining 
preventive care. For some suburban residents, care may less costly if facilities have located near 
them. On average, however, the more separated and spread out things are, the more costly and 
inconvenient obtaining care becomes. It seems sensible to expect that as the cost of obtaining 
preventive services rises, the probability of forgoing them increases. One study found that elderly 
people in sprawling suburban areas are more likely to be treated for ambulatory care sensitive 
conditions that are considered preventable with preventive care (Mobley et al. 2006a). Other 
research has found that added distance to a hospital does reduce the probability that central city 
black children have a checkup by about three percent (Currie and Reagen 2003). These findings 
suggest that at least for some, the cost of preventive care is affected by one’s environment and 
provides motivation for additional research.  
2.3 RELEVANT LITERATURE: SPRAWL AND HEALTH 
 The majority of urban form and health research focuses on areas other than preventive care 
and finds largely negative health effects of sprawl. One study found that sprawl is associated with 
higher risks of traffic fatalities, particularly for pedestrians (Ewing et al. 2003b). Another claimed 
that increased urban sprawl is associated with longer emergency medical service response times 
and delayed ambulance arrivals (Trowbridge et al. 2009). These studies imply health risks are part 
of the higher costs that sprawl can impose through greater car use. This may be especially higher 
among the elderly as they are more likely to cause traffic accidents than non-elderly adults and use 
ambulances (Loughran et al. 2007; Albert et al. 2013). 
Other studies look at a broad set of links between sprawl and health, including heart health. 
A small number of studies have attempted to link between urban sprawl and coronary heart disease. 
These studies, however, have mixed results and generally seem to find no effect. Of those papers, 
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two find an association between urban sprawl and coronary heart disease in women (Mobley et al. 
2006b; Griffin et al. 2012); while Ewing et al. (2003a) found sprawl be associated with higher 
rates of hypertension. 
The research focused on sprawl’s impact on food access and obesity has found stronger 
results. Christian (2010) found a negative correlation between sprawl and food insecurity. Ewing 
et al. (2003a) found that increases in sprawl are associated with less leisure time walking and 
higher rates of obesity. Other studies found a similar association between sprawl and obesity 
(Vandegraft and Yorked 2004), while another found that increased driving time was associated 
with an increased probability of obesity (Frank et al. 2004).  
The findings on obesity, however, were somewhat disputed and then reaffirmed by later 
literature. Some research suggested that people with high body max index measures tend to choose 
to live in high sprawl areas, which casts doubt on a causal link between sprawl and obesity 
(Plantinga and Bernell 2007). Similar correlational research claimed that there was no link at all 
between sprawl and obesity once time-invariant, unobserved characteristics were accounted for 
(Eid et al. 2008). Later causal research, however, found that had the proportion of the population 
living in dense areas not declined in the average metropolitan area from 1970-2000, then obesity 
would have been reduced by about 13% (Zhao and Kaestner 2010). 
2.4 DATA  
Preventive Care Outcomes 
To estimate the effect greater MSA sprawl has on acquiring certain preventive care services 
within medically recommended time windows, I use Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
(BRFSS) data from 2012 and an MSA sprawl index from 2010. The BRFSS contains survey data 
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on respondents’ use of preventive care services. The examined services such as breast, cervical, 
and colorectal cancer screenings and influenza vaccinations, are among those prioritized by the 
National Commission on Preventive Priorities (Maciosek et al. 2017). Other outcomes include 
biannual checkups and whether respondents have a personal doctor. The 2012 survey is used as 
questions are reflective of services received in past years and would include 2010 sprawl levels. 
The BRFSS data is used to create binary variables that take the value one if respondents acquired 
a given service within the recommended time window and zero otherwise. Table 4 displays the 
timing recommendations for the various services. 
TABLE 4: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PREVENTIVE CARE SERVICES 
Service Timing Recommending Body 
Routine Checkups 1-2 Years American Medical Association*5 
Flu Shots Yearly Center for Disease Control 
Mammograms 1-2 Years (Ages 45+) American Cancer Society 
Breast Exams Yearly (40+), 1-3 Years(20-39) American Cancer Society 
Pap Smears Every 3-5 years (21+) Mayo Clinic 
Colon/Sigmoidoscopies Every 10 years (50+) American Cancer Society 
 
While the BRFSS is a nationally representative survey, the full BRFSS is not necessarily 
MSA representative. This means that decisions concerning data usage and weighting needed to be 
made carefully. An alternative that was considered in place of the full BRFSS was the BRFSS 
SMART. The BRFSS SMART is another dataset offered by the CDC that focuses on MSAs. 
Unfortunately, it has a minimum response requirement to include data on a particular MSA in a 
given year. This excludes considerable MSAs that are less populous than others. These exclusions 
leave a restrictive subset of very similar MSAs in terms of sprawl characteristics and greatly 
reduced the variation off of which I aim to identify the effect of sprawl. I ultimately use the full 
 
5 The American Medical Association has not endorsed yearly checkups in more recent years. 
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BRFSS given the restrictiveness in the SMART data and apply MSA population weights in place 
of the BRFSS weights. Table 5 provides summary statistics for the BRFSS data  I use as control 
variables or to construct control variables. There are negligible differences between my 
unweighted subsample and the full, unweighted BRFSS.  
TABLE 5: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SUB-SAMPLE 
Variable Full BRFSS Sample MSA Sub-Sample 
Age 54.54 53.88 
White 73.63% 76.68% 
Black 11.66% 11.64% 
Asian (Non-Pacific Isl.) 1.97% 1.96% 
Female 59.65% 58.30% 
Married 51.80% 52.54% 
Highschool Diploma 26.21% 25.34% 
Some College 27.14% 27.28% 
4+ Years of College 38.87% 40.21% 
10k < Income < 15k 5.59% 5.53% 
15k < Income < 20k 7.45% 7.40% 
20k < Income < 25k 8.97% 8.94% 
25k < Income < 35k 10.65% 10.63% 
35k < Income < 50k 14.07% 14.10% 
50k < Income < 75k 15.79% 15.85% 
Income > 75k 32.09% 32.23% 
Employed for Wages 43.37% 45.88% 
Self-Employed 7.69% 7.94% 
Retired 27.15% 25.40% 
Has Any Health Insurance 88.61% 88.60% 
Measure of Sprawl 
The measures of urban sprawl come from a 2010 index of urban sprawl made available by 
Ewing et al. (2014)6 7. An older version of this index was used by Christian (2010). I use this 
sprawl index at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level and have measures for 205 MSAs in 
 
6 Index can be obtained at: https://gis.cancer.gov/tools/urban-sprawl/ 
7 Due to data collection difficulties, measures for Massachusetts are not included in this sprawl index. 
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44 states8. Ewing et al. (2014) calculate their measures of sprawl using four factors. Theses factors 
are in turn, the composition of multiple variables that can be associated with each factor. The 
factors are population density, mixed land use, economic centering, and street accessibility. A 
more sprawled MSA is associated with lower population densities, more segregated land use, more 
dispersed economic activity, and more convoluted street systems. Greater detail on what variables 
are used to construct the values of each factor can be found in Ewing et al (2014) or to a lesser 
degree in this chapter’s appendix discussion.  
The measure of each factor was constructed at the county level for around 1000 counties 
and was standardized to have a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 25. This mean and standard 
deviation largely holds when aggregating to the MSA level. The index also provides a composite 
score that is the equally-weighted average of the pre-standardized factors. As the individual factor 
measures are standardized and rounded, I cannot replicate the composite measure. 
The Instrumental Variable: The 1947 Highway Construction Plan 
 To address the concern that contemporaneous use of preventive care services and the level 
of sprawl of one’s home MSA may be correlated with unobserved preferences, I instrument for 
sprawl using the 1947 highway construction plan. I use a similar method to that used by Baum-
Snow (2007) and Zhao and Kaestner (2010), though in a static setting. Baum-Snow (2007) 
examined the effect highways had on suburbanization; a term sometimes used in place of urban 
sprawl. To address the endogeneity of contemporaneous choices of where governments build roads 
and where people elect to live, Baum-Snow used the 1947 federal interstate highway plan as an 
instrument for contemporaneous highway construction. The plan was designed to connect distant, 
 
8 States for which I do not have obesevations or do not have sprawl measures are: AK, DE, DC, HI, MA, MT, WY 
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major United States cities for the sake of national defense. The building of the interstate highway 
system was approved by the federal government in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944. The 
legislation required the plan to have highways “…so located as to connect by routes as direct as 
practicable, the principal metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers, to serve the national 
defense, and to connect at suitable border points with routes of continental importance in the 
Dominion of Canada and the Republic of Mexico…."9   
The argument for the instrument is that the planned location of highways is correlated with 
the location of current highways but is uncorrelated with unobserved contemporaneous preferences 
for highway location. Baum-Snow found that in the decades from the 1950s to the 1990s the 
population in central cities diminished by 17%, despite population growth in metropolitan areas of 
72%. The key factor that drove this suburbanization was the construction of interstate highways 
through important American cities (Baum-Snow 2007). The plan predates my first year of data by 
63 years and was meant to link cities for the sake of national defense and not for people to move 
to the suburbs nor enable (inhibit) their getting colonoscopies in the mid to late 2000s. On the 
surface, it seems likely that this instrument can address the endogeneity concern embedded in the 
selection of modern highway locations and their effect on sprawl and health care choices.  
I construct my instrument using a map of the 1947 plan which can be seen in Figure B.1 of 
Appendix C. Using the map, I created a count of highway rays running through the cities plotted 
on the map and those cities were then associated with the MSA in which they reside. A highway 
passing through a city is counted as having two rays. If a highway terminates in a city, then it 
 




contributes one ray. The number of highway rays in an MSA is the sum of all highways passing 
through or terminating in constituent cities.  
Validity challenges arise, however, in cross-sectional analysis using the 1947 highway plan 
as an instrument. Static, cross-MSA sprawl comparisons must carefully account for ray allocation. 
An initial concern is that the highway ray assignment is not as good as random. Cities included in 
the 1947 plan were large population centers. Unaccounted for, this alone serves as a violation of 
the independence assumption for instrumental variables. Further, variation in population in the 
1940s is not a desirable instrument as it is likely correlated with unobserved MSA and other 
characteristics unrelated to sprawl that affect health care utilization. Its inclusion in the instrument 
induces a violation of the exclusion restriction as planned highway rays could influence outcomes 
via pathways other than sprawl. 
 Conditional on MSA population in the 1940s, however, the number of rays is largely 
determined by a city’s geographic convenience. The total number of planned rays does not depend 
on the population; rather, it largely depends on a city’s geographic location relative to other cities 
included in the highway plan. To illustrate, consider the cities of Los Angeles, California, 
Indianapolis, Indiana, and Chattanooga, Tennessee. In 1940, Los Angeles had a population of 
around 1.5 million, Indianapolis had a population of under 400,000, and Chattanooga had a 
population of just over 125,000. Los Angeles and Chattanooga were assigned four highway rays. 
Indianapolis, however, was assigned seven.  
Chattanooga is mostly centered between Nashville, Tennessee, Atlanta, Georgia, 
Knoxville, Tennessee, and Birmingham, Alabama. It is due to this centrality that it receives as 
many highway rays as Los Angeles, which is a hub connecting Modesto, San Diego, Santa Monica, 
and San Bernardino. Indianapolis is relatively central to many populous midwestern cities such as 
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Columbus and Cincinnati, Ohio, St. Louis, Missouri, Louisville, Kentucky, and Chicago, Illinois 
among others. This happenstance led Indianapolis to be assigned more rays. It is the variation in 
total rays from some MSAs having more or fewer MSAs arrayed around them that this paper seeks 
to exploit. Once conditioned on the 1940 population and regional fixed effects, which account for 
regional differences in total populous cities, this number is largely random and does not rely on 
1940 characteristics of an MSA or its population that are likely correlated with health care 
utilization.  
 Turning from the independence assumption, the relevance and monotonicity assumptions 
are simpler to argue. I use a vector of indicators for planned highway rays for each MSA to allow 
for non-linear effects and to check monotonicity. The first-stage F-statistics hold steady at ten for 
all outcomes and the coefficient on each indicator is positive. This implies that sprawl increases 
with the number of rays in agreement with Baum-Snow (2007) and Zhao and Kaestner (2010) and 
that the monotonicity assumption is not violated.  
 The final assumption to be discussed is the exclusion restriction. The number of rays 
assigned to an MSA may be conditionally free of undesirable correlations with 1940 MSA and 
population characteristics, however, it may have concerning correlations with these characteristics 
in 2010. If constructed rays led to changes in MSA and population characteristics unrelated to 
sprawl but correlated with preventive care utilization, then the instrument fails the exclusion 
restriction. For example, if additional highway ray construction led to a greater prevalence of 
billboards advertising preventive care and in turn greater awareness of such care’s value, then 
highway rays could affect utilization through population awareness independently of sprawl. 




If differences in highway rays led to differences in per capita park acreage and the use of 
parks led to greater overall health from exercise, then the cost of becoming ill could rise to make 
preventive care more appealing. If the gain in overall health requires exercise to maintain and 
illness prevents exercise, then, while being healthier might reduce the likelihood and loss of health 
in illness, there is an added cost of deterioration absent maintenance. If the combined health loss 
due to illness and deterioration is greater than the loss in the absence of gains from exercise, then 
preventive care is more valuable. This could lead to a change in utilization and a violation of the 
exclusion restriction all else equal. I assume that such influences are at most minimal, but their 
potential existence should be acknowledged. 
2.5 METHODS 
 To push toward a causal interpretation of results, I use an instrumental variable 
specification rather than simple ordinary least squares (OLS). The concern in running a naïve OLS 
regression is that some unobserved factors or preferences could influence both where one decides 
to live and one’s health care behaviors. Any naively observed relationship between sprawl and 
preventive care, therefore, could be the result of an unobserved factor or preference and not reveal 
a true causal relationship. The likely endogenous naïve model is as follows, 
Pr(𝑃𝐶 = 1)𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙𝑗𝑘 +  𝛄𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒌 +  𝜼𝒁𝒋𝒌 + υ𝑘  +  µ𝐢𝐣𝐤          (1) 
where Pr(𝑃𝐶 = 1)𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the probability that individual i in MSA j in census region k has a given 
preventive care service in a recommended time frame. 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙𝑗𝑘 is the composite measure of the 
sprawl of MSA j in region k. 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒌 is a vector of individual controls that contains indicators for any 
health insurance, gender, race, marital status, employment, income, and education category. 
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Similarly, 𝒁𝒋𝒌 is a vector containing controls for doctors per 100,000 MSA residents in 2010
10, 
MSA level unemployment, and MSA population in 1940. υ𝑘  is a vector of census region fixed 
effects and µ𝐢𝐣 is the error term.  
My preferred specification is a two-stage least squares instrumental variable specification 
that is as follows  
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 1: 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙𝑗 = 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒅𝑯𝒘𝒚𝑹𝒂𝒚𝒔𝒋𝒌𝜶+  𝛄𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒌 +  𝜼𝒁𝒋𝒌 + υ𝑘 +  𝜂𝒋𝒌               (2) 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 2:Pr(𝑃𝐶 = 1)𝑖𝑗 = 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙𝑗𝑘̂ + 𝛄𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒌 +  𝜼𝒁𝒋𝒌 + υ𝑘 +  𝜇j                                  (3) 
where PlannedHwyRaysjk is the vector of indicators for planned highway rays for MSA j in region 
k in 1947. 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙𝑗𝑘̂  is the predicted composite sprawl measure. This approach avoids concerns of 
endogenous contemporaneous highway placement and pushes nearer causality as the intent of the 
highway plan was not to enable health care consumption.  
2.6 RESULTS 
 Table 6 contains the results for the naïve OLS. They largely suggest a standard deviation 
increase in sprawl reduces the probability of obtaining timely preventive care; though, only 
significantly for pap smears and mammograms. The OLS results also suggest that increased sprawl 
significantly reduces the probability of having a personal doctor. They show no significant effect 
of sprawl on the probability of being obese; however, the coefficient does have an intuitive sign. 
All of the effects are small in size and represent less than two percent of the respective sample 
mean.  
 
10 This comes from the Area Health Resource File for 2010. 
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Table 7 shows the first stage for the preferred two-stage-least-squares specification. The 
instrument is strong with an F-statistic just over ten and shows monotonicity. Table 8 displays the 
results for the IV portion of my preferred specification. The effects are similar in direction to the 
OLS’s results though mostly larger and significant for flu vaccines, pap smears, sigmoid and 
colonoscopies, and obesity. They suggest that, relative to the mean, a standard deviation increase 
in sprawl reduces the probability of having a timely colonoscopy by 0.5 percent, a pap smear by 
2.1 percent, and increases the probability of having an annual flu vaccine and being obese by 4.8 
and 4.9 percent respectively. Significance aside, the results for the OLS and IV specifications 










TABLE 6: SIMPLE OLS REGRESSIONS 
                  
VARIABLES Has Doctor Checkup Flu Vaccine Pap Smear Breast Exam Mammogram 
Sigmoid/ 
Colonoscopy Obese 
                  
Sprawl (SD) -0.00672** -0.00527 0.00697 -0.0137*** -0.00101 -0.00757* -0.00255 0.00437 
 (0.00337) (0.00338) (0.00520) (0.00456) (0.00453) (0.00418) (0.00193) (0.00339) 
         
Census Region FE x x x x x x x x 
Observations 199,784 198,362 195,050 106,204 102,610 76,536 84,863 192,985 
Mean 0.857 0.856 0.468 0.833 0.72 0.821 0.952 0.283 
        
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) clustered at the MSA level. Control variables include indicators for any health 
insurance, gender, race, marital status, employment, income, education category, doctors per 100,000 MSA residents, MSA level unemployment, MSA 











TABLE 7: FIRST STAGE OF IV 
    
VARIABLES Sprawl (SD) 
    
1st Ray 0.451 
 (0.383) 
2nd Ray 0.172 
 (0.211) 
3rd Ray 1.204*** 
 (0.236) 
4th Ray 0.681*** 
 (0.182) 
5th Ray 1.485*** 
 (0.282) 
6th Ray 1.284** 
 (0.539) 
7th Ray 0.453 
 (0.290) 
8th Ray 1.225*** 
 (0.277) 
10th Ray 3.825*** 
 (0.736) 
13th Ray 0.644*** 
 (0.223) 
Census Region 2 0.118 
 (0.187) 
Census Region 3 0.488** 
 (0.188) 
Census Region 4 -0.651*** 
 (0.208) 







TABLE 8: 2SLS IV REGRESSIONS 
        
          
VARIABLES Has Doctor Checkup Flu Vaccine Pap Smear Breast Exam Mammogram 
Sigmoid/ 
Colonoscopy Obese 
                  
Sprawl (SD) -0.00998 -0.00803 0.0226* -0.0176* 0.000780 -0.00683 -0.00476* 0.0139** 
 (0.00644) (0.00771) (0.0118) (0.00924) (0.00934) (0.0110) (0.00287) (0.00663) 
         
Census Region FE x x x x x x x x 
Observations 199,784 198,362 195,050 106,204 102,610 76,536 84,863 192,985 
Mean 0.857 0.856 0.468 0.833 0.72 0.821 0.952 0.283 
F-Stat 10.12 10.09 10.19 10.19 10.31 10.29 10.54 10.13 
        
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) clustered at the MSA level. Control variables include  
indicators for any health insurance, gender, race, marital status, employment, income, education category, doctors per 100,000 MSA  





In the data section, changes in MSA amenities due to sprawl were mentioned as possible 
pathways to violations of the exclusion restriction. Such changes could also lead to an endogeneity 
concern. For example, a change in park acreage could lead to population sorting in which more 
health-conscious people choose to live in areas with greater per capita park acreage. These 
populations would likely use more preventive care and differences across MSAs could be driven 
by population composition.  Similarly, if health-conscious individuals prefer sprawled or compact 
areas, then population sorting over time could create disparities in health care utilization due to 
preference rather than sprawl.  
To examine this possibility, I incorporate a specification similar to one used to examine 
sorting in Combes et al. (2007). In my specification, two parallel stages lend predicted values to a 
subsequent final stage. The first part of the parallel step employs essentially the OLS regression in 
which MSA fixed effects are included in the place of sprawl. The second part of the parallel step 
is essentially the first stage of the IV which only controls for 1940 MSA population and census 
region fixed effects. 
The goal of the first parallel stage is to extract the common effect of living in an MSA on 
outcomes, embedded in which is the causal effect of MSA sprawl. By focusing on the estimated 
effect of sprawl through the MSA fixed effect, I avoid potential unobserved characteristics, such 
as individual fixed effects, that could bias results in the simple two-stage IV. Within the individual 
fixed effect could be preferences to live in sprawled areas or in areas conducive to exercise or other 
healthy behaviors. This specification aims to minimize the influence of such unobserved 
characteristics since to be in the MSA fixed effect a characteristic or propensity must be shared by 
all residents. It also preserves the easy interpretation of results for a linear probability model.  
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The final stage uses predicted MSA fixed effects and sprawl from the two parallel stages 
to examine the causal relationship between sprawl and preventive care. The specification is as 
follows 
                                                                                   
           
      
Where 𝑀𝑆𝐴_𝐹𝐸𝑗̂  is the predicted MSA fixed effect for MSA j in census region k. 
PlannedHwyRaysj is the vector of highway ray indicators and 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙̂ j is the predicted value of 
sprawl. In stage 1a MSA population weights are used and robust standard errors are clustered at 
the MSA level. In stage 1b and stage 2 the unit of observations is the MSA and robust standard 
errors. Table 9 shows the results for this specification. The results are similar to the main 
specification, however, the instrument is somewhat weaker. While the results may be reassuring, 
they do not comprehensively rule out potential concerns.  
Further exploration of the endogeneity concern is limited but does also provide a brief 
check of the exclusion restriction as well. Using park acreage data extracted from a 2011 
publication by the Center for City Park Excellence and The Trust for Public Land, I examine if 
planned highway rays led to changes in park acreage per 1,000 city residents (City Park Facts 
2011). If more planned rays led to changes in park acreage, then this could induce either unwanted 
sorting or the mentioned violation of the exclusion restriction. Unfortunately, only the 100 largest 
cities had their park acreage published and many MSAs have multiple constituent cities. Without 
knowing the acreage of each constituent city, I could not aggregate this data to the MSA level and 
my analysis was limited at the city level. 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 2:𝑀𝑆𝐴_𝐹𝐸𝑗𝑘̂ =𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙𝑗𝑘̂  +𝑀𝑆𝐴_𝑝𝑜𝑝1940𝑗𝑘 +  υ𝑘 +  𝜂𝑗𝑘         (6) 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 1𝑎: Pr(𝑃𝐶 = 1)𝑖𝑗 = 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝜸 +  𝜼𝒁𝒋 + 𝑀𝑆𝐴_𝐹𝐸𝑗 +  𝑖𝑗     (4) 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 1𝑏: 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑙𝑗𝑘 = 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒅𝑯𝒘𝒚𝑹𝒂𝒚𝒔𝒋𝒌𝜶+𝑀𝑆𝐴_𝑝𝑜𝑝1940𝑗𝑘 +  υ𝑘 +  𝜇jk       (5) 
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Table 10 shows the simple OLS results where park acres per 1,000 city population in 2010 
is the outcome and planned rays are the explanatory variable of interest. I control for 1940s 
population and census region fixed effects. The results show no significant association between 
planned rays and future park acreage. This is somewhat reassuring; though, all possible violations 
of the exclusion restriction and endogeneity concerns cannot be ruled out similarly. Nevertheless, 
this does lend support to a causal interpretation of the preferred specification.  
In a companion check of the sorting concern and the independence assumption, I examine 
whether mean 1940 MSA temperature is predictive of planned highway ray allocation. If warmer 
or colder MSAs were assigned rays based on how easy or arduous it would be to construct 
highways in such temperatures, then rays are not assigned randomly even conditional on 1940 
MSA population and census region. Further, given historic temperatures’ correlation with current 
temperatures, if planned rays are associated with MSA temperatures, then the sorting concern 
arises again if populations sort based on weather. Table 11 shows the results for this OLS 
regression. Mean MSA temperature in 1940 is the outcome and I control for 1940 MSA population 
and region fixed effects. I do not find mean temperature to be a significant predictor of planned 
highway rays. This lends additional support to a causal interpretation of the preferred specification.  
A secondary concern to those just explored is the sign on flu vaccines. It is consistently 
positive and suggests that increased sprawl leads to a higher probability of vaccinations. 
Intuitively, one might expect all preventive service use to decline. However, this increase could be 
due to the spread of development increasing access to newly built drug stores and grocery stores 
which can administer flu vaccines. If this is the case and sprawl makes it less convenient to visit 
medical facilities, then the probability of receiving a vaccination in a traditional medical facility 
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such as a doctor’s office, hospital, or clinic should decline while the probability of receiving one 
in a store should rise.  
To investigate this, I use data provided by the BRFSS on flu vaccine location to create 
binary indicators for whether respondents were vaccinated in a traditional medical facility rather 
than anywhere else and in a store rather than anywhere else. Table 12 displays the results for two 
separate regressions. Each indicator was used as the outcome variable in the preferred IV 
specification. Though imprecise, the results suggest that a standard deviation increase in sprawl 
reduced the probability of receiving a vaccination in a traditional location and increased the 
probability of receiving it in a store.  
2.7 DISCUSSION 
This work contributes to the literature by adding to an area of sparsity and reinforcing 
previous findings. The methods used here have pushed largely correlational literature closer to 
causality. In pushing closer to causality, the findings here and those they reinforce increase in 
value to policymakers. My findings suggest that urban sprawl tends to reduce the likelihood of 
preventive care use, though, very minorly in some cases. Across various specifications, sprawl 
consistently had a negative impact on preventive care use, except for flu vaccines. My preferred 
results suggest a standard deviation increase in sprawl led to a statistically significant reduction in 
the probability of having a timely colonoscopy or pap smear by 0.5 percent and 2.1 percent 
respectively. Though imprecise in the preferred specification, across all specifications employed, 
sprawl is suggested to reduce the probability of having a personal doctor, a biannual checkup, and 
mammograms. The effect sizes are small and consistently negative even if imprecise. 
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If forgone screening services lead to higher rates of late-stage cancer or chronic diseases, 
then greater urban sprawl likely worsens the overall health of MSA populations, all else equal. A 
caveat, however, is that there are many more health care services, including others that are meant 
to prevent or treat, which are not considered here. My findings suggest a fairly negative impact of 
sprawl; however, it would be ill-advised to extrapolate beyond the scope of what is presented here, 
including for flu shots. The preferred results suggest that greater sprawl increases the likelihood 
of obtaining a flu vaccine by nearly five percent. A higher probability of receiving a flu shot could 
either be evidence of desirable health behavior if independent of all other types of care or 
undesirable if it represents unwanted substitution away from other services.  
Consistent with other work, I also find sprawl led to increases in the probability of obesity. 
Ewing et al. (2003) found that the odds of being obese in a county one standard deviation below 
mean sprawl levels were only ninety percent of those for one living in a county one standard 
deviation above the mean sprawl level. Vandegraft and Yoke (2004) find that obesity rates rose 
with the percentage of developed land. Frank et al. (2004) found an association between increased 
mixed land use (less sprawl) and decreased obesity. Zhao and Kaestner (2010) suggest significant 
decreases in population density (more sprawl) led to significant increases in obesity. My findings 
suggest that a standard deviation increase in composite sprawl, which includes measures of mixed 
land use and population density, led to a 4.8 percent increase in the probability of being obese.  
 A key takeaway is that I do not find sprawl to be preventive care nor obesity neutral. My 
findings point to sprawl largely having a consistently negative effect on preventive care. In 
conjunction with the wider literature, this suggests that urban policymakers should take health 
effects into account when making urban form decisions. My findings continue a trend suggesting 
that sprawl has fairly undesirable effects on health. Again, however, I caution against sweeping 
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statements as the direction of my flu vaccination results suggests there is more to be considered. There may be possible benefits of 
sprawl that will come to light in future research.  
TABLE 9. MSA FEREGRESSIONS 
                  
VARIABLES Has Doctor Checkup 
Flu 
Vaccine Pap Smear 
Breast 
Exam Mammogram Sig/Colonoscopy Obese 
                  
Sprawl (SD) -0.0129 -0.00454 0.00448 -0.0115 0.00555 -0.0106* -0.00516** 0.0106*** 
 (0.0148) (0.00290) (0.0141) (0.0147) (0.0103) (0.00617) (0.00254) (0.00220) 
         
Census Region FE x x x x x x x x 
Observations 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
F-Stat 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 
Mean 0.857 0.856 0.445 0.821 0.712 0.814 0.945 0.277 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) clustered at the region level. Control variables include  
indicators for any health insurance, gender, race, marital status, employment, income, education category, doctors per 100,000 MSA  
residents, MSA level unemployment, MSA population in 1940, and are census region fixed effects. 
TABLE 10. CITY PARK ACREAGE REGRESSION 
    
VARIABLES Acres Per 1,000 Residents 
    







Census Region FE x 
Observations 95 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses  
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) clustered at the state level. 
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TABLE 11. 1940 MSA TEMPERATURE REGRESSION 
    
VARIABLES Planned Rays 
    
Mean MSA Temperature 1940 -0.0589 
 (0.0424) 
MSA Population 1940 1.01e-06*** 
 (2.37e-07) 
  
Census Region FE x 
Observations 205 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1), clustered at state level. 
 
TABLE 12. FLU VACCINE LOCATION  
      
VARIABLES Traditional Health Facility Store (Drug Store, Grocery, etc.) 
      
Sprawl (SD) -0.0317 0.0179 
 (0.0237) (0.0193) 
   
Observations 85,679 85,679 
F-Stat 10.42 10.42 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) clustered at the MSA level.  
Control variables include indicators for any health insurance, gender, race, marital status, employment,  
income, education category, doctors per 100,000 MSA residents, MSA level unemployment, MSA  
population in 1940, and are census region fixed effects. Model is linear probability and  results should be  




CHAPTER III: STRONG SOCIAL DISTANCING MEASURES IN THE UNITED 
STATES REDUCED THE COVID-19 GROWTH RATE11 
 3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A critical question during the COVID-19 pandemic is the effectiveness of the social 
distancing policies adopted by US states and localities in bending the curve. Although these 
policies take a variety of forms – such as imposing shelter-in-place orders (SIPOs); restricting 
dine-in at restaurants; closing other non-essential business such as bars, entertainment venues, and 
gyms; banning large social gatherings; and closing public schools – their effectiveness depends 
critically on the cooperation of the public. For example, although California’s first-in-the-nation 
SIPO carries threats of fines and incarceration, its effectiveness fundamentally relies on social 
pressure (Friedson et al., 2020). Compliance with social distancing orders appears to be related to 
local income, partisanship, and political beliefs in the US; and compliance with self-quarantines is 
related to potential losses in income in Israel (Bodas and Peleg, 2020; Painter and Qiu, 2020; 
Wright et al., 2020). 
Some epidemiological models forecast the eventual number of COVID-19 cases and 
fatalities based on untested assumptions about the impact of social distancing policies in 
contemporary society. The widely cited Imperial College model notes the impact of social 
distancing measures will likely vary between countries and even communities. In their modeling 
of social distancing, they assume all households reduce contact outside the household, school, or 
workplace by 75 percent, school contact rates are unchanged, workplace contact rates fall by 25 
percent, and household contact rates rise by 25 percent (Ferguson et al., 2020). Another study 
 
11 This chapter is coauthered with Charles Courtemanche, Anh Le, Joshua Pinkston, and Aaron Yelowitz 
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assumes social distancing measures will reduce the average contact rate by 38 percent, based on 
evidence from the 1918 influenza pandemic (Thunstrom et al., Forthcoming).  
At issue is not whether isolation works to limit the spread of disease, but rather whether 
the particular government restrictions designed to encourage social distancing in the US reduced 
spread relative to simply providing information and recommendations. Individuals may 
voluntarily engage in avoidance behavior, such as hand washing or wearing masks, once they fully 
perceive the risks of contagion (Abaluck et al., 2020; Harris, 2020). Critics of government 
measures highlight Sweden’s less intrusive response to COVID-19, although Sweden’s strategy is 
increasingly questioned (Reuters, 2020). 
The literature on the COVID-19 pandemic in the US is evolving rapidly, and at the time of 
our writing, we were aware of several working papers using quasi-experimental econometric 
methods to examine the consequences of social distancing policies. Recent work examined 
mobility and location trends from Google at the state-level and found significant effects of stronger 
measures (like SIPOs) on movement using difference-in-differences methods.10 Similar findings 
have been found in a study with SafeGraph mobility data (Andersen, 2020), although a different 
study using PlaceIQ and SafeGraph data found strong measures were not important (Gupta et al., 
2020). California’s SIPO significantly reduced COVID-19 cases, and a broader analysis of all 
SIPOs found increased rates of staying home full-time and reductions in COVID-19 cases 
(Friedson et al., 2020; Dave et al., 2020). Other authors used interrupted time-series methods and 
found that early statewide social distancing measures were associated with decreases in states’ 
COVID-19 growth rates, but later SIPOs did not lead to further reductions (Siedner et al., 2020). 
Our work – which leveraged both state and county policy variation and used a flexible 
event-study method that allowed for effects to vary across measures and over time – estimated the 
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impacts of four types of social distancing measures on confirmed COVID-19 case growth rates 
through April 27, 2020.  The reduced-form approach captures any potential pathways driven by 
these mandates, including complementary avoidance behaviors that the public may engage in if 
these orders provide an informational shock in addition to increasing social distancing. 
3.2 DATA 
The unit of observation was daily US county/county equivalents. Although there are 3,142 
counties in the US, official COVID-19 records report New York City as a whole rather than 
dividing it into five counties, reducing this number to 3,138. Our dataset tracked counties over 58 
days from March 1, 2020 to April 27, 2020, leading to a sample size of 182,004. We chose March 
1 as the start date because no new cases were reported in the entire U.S. on most days in January 
and February. The April 27 end date was chosen to coincide with the first removal of one of four 
types of restrictions we analyzed (the re-opening of restaurants and other entertainment facilities 
in Georgia) (Georgia 2020). Each county observation was weighted by population using 2018 
estimates from the United States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, 2019). 
We examined the daily growth rate in confirmed COVID-19 cases at the county level, 
which originated from the 2019 Novel Coronavirus COVID-19 Data Repository provided by the 
Johns Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering. This repository collected data on 
COVID-19 cases worldwide from a range of sources including government and independent health 
institutions (John Hopkins University, 2020). 
The daily exponential growth rate was calculated as the natural log of cumulative daily 
COVID-19 cases minus the log of cumulative daily COVID-19 cases on the prior day. We chose 
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this functional form because epidemiological models predict exponential growth in the absence of 
intervention. Percent growth in cases is identical to percent growth in cases per capita since 
reported county populations did not vary during the sample period. The growth rate was multiplied 
by 100 and can be read as percentage point changes. In computing the growth rate, we followed a 
recent COVID-19 study and added one to the case counts to avoid dropping counties that started 
with zero cases (Burstztyn et al., 2020). 
The data on the timing of state and local government social distancing interventions was 
gathered from a host of sources and made available by Johns Hopkins University (Killeen et al., 
2020). The appendix explains a few corrections we made to the dates and provides a list of state- 
and county-level policies used in the analysis.  
We focused on four government-imposed interventions: SIPOs, public school closures, 
bans on large social gatherings, and closures of entertainment-related businesses. For large 
gatherings, we used the date of the first prohibition that was at least as restrictive as 500 people. 
Most of the bans were much more restrictive: 95 percent of the time (in our population-weighted 
sample) the prohibition extended to 50 people. For entertainment-related businesses, we used the 
date of the first closure of either restaurant dining areas (including bars) or gyms/entertainment 
centers. 96 percent of the time, if one such prohibition was in place, the other was in place as well. 
We included control variables related to the availability of COVID-19 tests. The same Data 
Repository that provides cases also includes daily counts of positive, negative, and pending tests 
in each state on each day, which we added together. To mirror our measure of cases, we converted 
this testing variable to the exponential daily growth rate of cumulative tests performed. In the 
appendix, we show that the results were robust to the use of other functional forms. Since COVID-
19 test results are generally not available immediately, we also included the one-day lag of this 
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growth rate. Further lags (out to 10 days) were considered but always statistically insignificant, so 
we did not include them. Most states did not report any pending tests, meaning that they did not 
officially record tests until the results were obtained. This likely explains the lack of a longer lag 
between testing growth and case growth.  
3.3 METHODS 
We estimated the relationship between social distancing policies and the exponential 
growth rate of confirmed COVID-19 cases using an event-study regression with multiple 
treatments. This approach is akin to difference-in-differences but more flexible, as it interacts the 
treatment variables with multiple indicators of time since implementation, thereby tracing out the 
evolution of the treatment effects over time (Saloner and Maclean, 2020). 
For each of the four policies, we include seven variables: whether it was implemented 1-5, 
6-10, 11-15, 16-20, or more than 20 days ago; and whether it will be implemented 5-9 or 10 or 
more days later. Implementation on the current day through four days from now was, therefore, 
the reference group. If a county never adopted the policy, each of these variables was set to 0 
throughout the sample period. Our econometric specification is as follows  
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ln (𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑) − ln(𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1)



























(ln (𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑐,𝑑−𝑖) − ln(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1−𝑖)) + 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑐 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦_𝑏𝑦_𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑑 + 𝑐𝑑 
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑 contains the cumulative confirmed COVID-19 cases in county c on day d (with 1 added 
to prevent the variable from being undefined when the county does not yet have a case). 𝑆𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑐𝑑𝑖 is 
an indicator for whether a shelter-in-place order was enacted i time periods before day d in county 









−2 ≡ 10 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑
−1 ≡ 5 𝑡𝑜 9 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑
1 ≡ 1 𝑡𝑜 5 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑
2 ≡ 6 𝑡𝑜 10 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑
3 ≡ 11 𝑡𝑜 15 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑
4 ≡ 16 𝑡𝑜 20 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑







 , leaving 0 to 4 days before d as the omitted reference 
range; i.e. the coefficients reflect differences between the predicted growth rate under a policy 
enacted i periods ago versus one that will be enacted within the next four days. 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑑𝑖 is an 
indicator for whether schools were closed starting i periods before day d in county c. 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑑𝑖 is 
an indicator for whether large events were banned (at least as stringent as 500 people) starting i 
periods before day d in county c. 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑑𝑖 is an indicator for whether restaurants or 
gyms/entertainment centers were closed starting i periods before day d in county c. 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑑 is the 
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cumulative COVID-19 tests recorded in the state containing county c on day d (with 1 added to 
prevent the variable from being undefined when the state has not yet run a test); the summation 
term before the log-difference in tests reflects the fact that the lag of the log difference is also 
included. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑐 is the fixed effect for county c; this captures unobserved county-level variables 
that do not vary during our sample period, which is why we do not control for county 
characteristics, such as population density, demographics, or voting behavior, that might influence 
case growth rates. 𝐷𝑎𝑦_𝑏𝑦_𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑑 is a fixed effect for day d (ranging from March 1 to April 27, 
2020) in the Census Division containing county c; this captures unobserved variables that trend 
over time, and allows these time trends to vary by Census Division.  𝑐𝑑  is the error term for county 
c on day d. 
An event study model is particularly useful to study the impact of social distancing policies 
on COVID-19 cases for two reasons. First, after accounting for the incubation period and time 
between the onset of first symptoms and positive test results, such policies likely only affect 
official cases after a considerable lag (Lauer et al. 2020). Additionally, the inclusion of variables 
reflecting future implementation allows for an analysis of pretreatment trends. Since it is not 
plausible for policies that have not yet been implemented to causally affect current cases, finding 
such associations could suggest misspecification. For instance, one might expect counties with 
rapidly growing case counts to be the most likely to enact these measures, leading to a reverse-
causal relationship between current cases and future policies that would be detected by our model. 
Each policy was implemented at least 10 days after the start of the sample period and at 
least 20 days prior to the end. Therefore, each policy contributes to the identifying variation for all 
coefficients except those for more than 20 days ago and 10 or more days from now. Since the 
estimated policy effects at those two “catch-all” time periods could partially reflect compositional 
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changes, they should therefore be interpreted with more caution than the estimates for the other 
time intervals. 
In addition to the testing controls discussed above, the model also included fixed effects 
for geography and time. County fixed effects accounted for the likelihood that, even aside from 
differences in policies, case growth rates may have varied due to a number of county 
characteristics, including population density and residents’ education, political orientation, and age 
(Painter and Qiu, 2020; Wright et al., 2020). Fixed effects for each day in each of the nine U.S. 
Census Divisions (522 fixed effects in total) allowed for flexible underlying trends in growth rates 
that could vary in different parts of the country, helping to account for the staggered nature of the 
outbreak across locations (United States Census Bureau, Undated). We reported 95% confidence 
intervals, with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by state, the level of most 
of the policy variation. 
3.4 RESULTS 
Descriptive Information 
Confirmed COVID-19 cases grew rapidly during the sample period, from just 30 on March 
1 to 978,047 on April 27. Appendix D, Figure C.1 shows the number of counties with any COVID-
19 cases on each day. On March 1, the vast majority of counties had zero cases, and across all 
days, 49 percent of unweighted county-by-day observations were zero. However, counties with 
zero cases tended to have low populations, so our population weights limited the influence of these 
counties on the results. Moreover, in Appendix J, we showed that our conclusions were not 
sensitive to handling zeros in different ways other than adding one when computing the logs: using 
the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, which is defined at zero, and estimating separate 
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regressions for whether the county had any cases and the exponential growth rate conditional on 
having cases (Burstztyn et al., 2020). 
Figure 8 illustrates the reach of social distancing policies on the US population over time. 
The SIPO was generally the last policy to be implemented, and adoption was uniformly lower than 
the other policies. On March 1, no jurisdiction had implemented all four measures. By March 22, 
nearly 25 percent of the US population was covered by all the measures, growing to approximately 
65 percent by March 29 and 95 percent by April 7, when the last SIPO took effect. 
FIGURE 8: U.S. POPULATION COVERED BY SOCIAL DISTANCING POLICIES 
 
 
Impact of Social Distancing Policies 
62 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the coefficients (and confidence intervals) for SIPOs and bans on large 
gatherings derived from the event-study model. Relative to the reference category of 0-4 days 
before implementation, SIPOs lead to statistically significant reductions in the COVID-19 case 
growth rate of 3.0 percentage points after 6-10 days, 4.5 after 11-15 days, 5.9 after 16-20 days, 
and 8.6 from day 21 onward. Because the model held constant the other types of policies, these 
estimates should be interpreted as the additional effect of SIPOs beyond shutting down schools, 
large gatherings, and entertainment-related businesses. This additional effect may come from 
either the requirement/strong advisement to shelter-in-place aside from “essential” activities or the 
accompanying closure of any “non-essential” businesses that remained open. We did not observe 
any statistically significant “placebo” effects of SIPOs in the periods prior to implementation, 
giving credence to a causal interpretation of our main results. If anything, the pre-trend appears to 
point upward, which would make our estimates in the post-treatment period conservative.   
We found no evidence that bans on large social gatherings influenced the growth rate. The 
point estimates for banning gatherings were statistically insignificant. However, the 95% 
confidence intervals included reductions of up to 3-6 percentage points, so the lack of evidence of 
an effect should not be misinterpreted as clear evidence of no effect. Also, the lack of a statistically 
significant reduction in the post-treatment period could potentially be due to an upward (though 
not statistically significant) pre-treatment trend. However, results from the aforementioned event 
study with separate variables for each day showed that the pre-trend disappeared four days prior 




FIGURE 9: EVENT-STUDY MODEL – SIPO AND GATHERING BANS 
 
Figure 10 shows estimates for the restaurant-and-entertainment-related businesses and 
school closings. Closing restaurant dining rooms/bars and/or entertainment centers/gyms led to 
statistically significant reductions in the growth rate of COVID-19 cases in all time periods after 
implementation. The estimated effect was 4.4 percentage points after 1-5 days, 4.7 after 6-10 days, 
6.1 after 11-15 days, 5.6 after 16-20 days, and 5.2 after 21 or more. Prior to implementation, 








FIGURE 10: EVENT-STUDY MODEL – SCHOOL AND ENTERTAINMENT CLOSURES 
 
In contrast, we found no evidence that school closures influenced the growth rate. The 
point estimates were never close to statistically significant, but the 95% confidence intervals meant 
that we could not rule out reductions of up to 4-5 percentage points.  
Adding the coefficient estimates for each policy gives the combined effect of implementing 
all four social distancing policies. In days 1-5 after implementation, the bundle of restrictions 
reduced the growth rate of COVID-19 cases by 5.4 percentage points. In days 6-10 after 
implementation, the growth rate fell by 6.8 percentage points. This reduction grew to 6.8 
percentage points after 6-10 days, 8.2 percentage points after 11-15, 9.1 after 16-20, and 12.0 after 
21 or more. As discussed previously, the estimate for 21+ days should be viewed with caution, as 
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it did not utilize the same geographic balance of treatments as the estimates for the other time 
intervals. A conservative interpretation of these results would therefore be that the impact reached 
9.1 percentage points after 16-20 days and appeared to remain at least as high after that. 
Counterfactual Simulations 
Figure 11 compares the observed growth rate of COVID-19 cases to two counterfactuals: 
1) none of the four social distancing measures ever being imposed and 2) no SIPO ever being 
imposed. The process for creating these counterfactuals is described in this chapter’s appendix 
discussion. The mean exponential growth rate without any interventions was 16.2 percent over the 
full time period. The observed and both counterfactual growth rates peaked on March 19, 2020 at 
26-28 percent but started to diverge afterward, eight days after the earliest restriction. Without any 
social distancing policies, the case growth rate would have stayed similarly high for another week 
before gradually falling to 14 percent by April 27, 2020. Without SIPOs – but keeping the other 
restrictions – the growth rate would have fallen to 11 percent. The actual growth rate, which 
reflects all implemented distancing policies including SIPOs, fell to 3 percent by that date. 
Figure 12 compares the reported number of COVID-19 cases over time to the number of 
cases predicted by our event-study regression under these same two counterfactual scenarios. 
Again, see this chapter’s appendix discussion for details. The graph uses the natural logarithm of 
nationwide cases (or predicted cases) for the y-axis scale, but with corresponding numbers labeled 
on the y-axis instead of logs.  
In all three scenarios, cases increased roughly linearly on the log scale, as expected under 
exponential growth, until the last week of March – approximately two weeks after the first 
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restrictions and one week after the first SIPO. The actual curve then began to flatten substantially, 
eventually leading to 978,047 cases by April 27. In contrast, the two counterfactual curves only 
FIGURE 11:OBSERVED GROWTH RATE AND ESTIMATED GROWTH RATES
 
flattened slightly. By the end of the sample period, the model predicts that cases would 
have been 10 times higher without SIPOs (10,224,598) and 35 times higher (35,257,098) without 
any social distancing restrictions. Interestingly, the closures of restaurants/entertainment facilities 
accounted for a larger share of the reduction in cases than SIPOs, despite SIPOs having larger 
coefficient estimates. This is because restaurant/entertainment facilities were implemented earlier 
and in more places than SIPOs. With exponential growth, several days can make a substantial 
difference.   
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FIGURE 12: SOCIAL DISTANCING POLICIES FLATTEN THE CURVE (LOG SCALE) 
 
Robustness Checks Related to Multicollinearity 
Our event-study specification included 24 different treatment variables (6 for each of the 4 
policies) as well as Census-Division-by-day fixed effects, raising the question of whether there 
was sufficient identifying variation to precisely identify the impacts of the different policies. In 
particular, this could conceivably have explained the null results for public school closures and 
large event bans. Our first two robustness checks, therefore, utilized a simpler specification that 
included only a single variable for each policy type: whether the policy was in effect 10 days ago 
in the first regression and 20 days ago in the second. (The lag allowed for incubation periods, 
testing delays, etc.) Also, we included day fixed effects rather than their interactions with each of 
the nine Census Divisions. This means that policy differences across Census Divisions were 
allowed to contribute to the identifying variation, whereas the baseline model relied only on 
within-Census-Division variation.  
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The results are in Table C.3 of Appendix H . We observed the same pattern of results as 
we did in our main model: SIPOs had the largest statistically significant effect, 
restaurant/entertainment closures had the second largest, and large event bans and school closures 
had no discernable impacts.  
Robustness Checks Related to Testing 
We performed a series of checks aimed to ensure that the results were not driven by the 
way in which we controlled for testing. Specifically, we were concerned about two issues. First, 
the baseline model’s functional form for tests was the daily log difference in cumulative tests (as 
well as its first lag), which mirrored our specification for the outcome variable, effectively 
assuming that a given percentage increase in testing corresponded to a given percentage increase 
in cases. However, it is possible that the relationship between testing and cases is better 
characterized by a different functional form. Second, the number of tests performed depends not 
only on availability but also on the severity of the outbreak. The coefficient estimates for the testing 
variables were therefore likely biased, and bias could have spilled over to the coefficient estimates 
for the policy variables.  
Accordingly, we run four checks. The first three use different functional forms for the 
testing variables: 1) ln(new tests) – i.e. the log of the difference rather than the difference in the 
logs, 2) new tests (not logged) per 1,000 residents, and 3) cumulative tests run to date. The fourth 
check simply excludes testing variables completely.  The results, presented in Table C.4 of the 
Appendix I alongside the corresponding estimates from the baseline model, show that testing was 
indeed positively associated with cases, but our coefficient estimates of interest were remarkably 
stable across the different specifications. While none of the testing measures are perfect, this 
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stability increased our confidence that differential trends in access to testing across counties did 
not drive our conclusions. 
Robustness Checks Related to Timing 
Our next series of robustness checks related to the subjective nature of the start date of the 
sample. For our baseline results, we began the sample period on March 1. We excluded prior days 
because there were no new reported cases in the U.S. on most days in January in February. We did 
not start later in March because using the entire month allowed for ten days prior to the 
implementation of any policy with which we could examine pre-trends. However, arguments could 
be made for either earlier or later start dates. On one hand, an earlier start date would utilize more 
data and allow for a longer pre-treatment period. On the other hand, the earlier the start date, the 
more counties started the sample with no cases, exacerbating any potential issues created by adding 
one to the log of cases to prevent the outcome from being undefined.  
Our first two checks simply started the sample a half month earlier and later: Feb. 15 and 
March 15, respectively. The third check used all available data, meaning a Jan. 22 start date. The 
fourth check used this longer period but avoided adding one to the log of cases by running two 
separate regressions: 1) one with the full sample but an indicator for any cases as the outcome 
(linear probability model due to the bias inherent in nonlinear fixed effects models), and 2) one 
with exponential growth rate as the outcome, but without adding one to the log of cases when 
creating the variable, thereby restricting the sample to counties with cases on both the current and 
previous days.12 Next, we return to the original March 1 start date and avoid adding one to the log 
 
12 Note that this is not exactly equivalent to the conventional two-part model, which would use a dichotomized 
version of the continuous outcome as the dependent variable in the first part. In our setting, that would mean using 
the original outcome variable (with one added to the log of cases), and conditioning the sample for the second part 
on having a non-zero growth rate, meaning counties with cases but no growth in the previous day would also be 
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of cases a different way: by using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, which is interpretable 
in the same manner as natural logs but defined at zero.13  
Appendix J, Table C.5 displays the results. Across all start dates, we continued to find that 
SIPOs and restaurant/entertainment center closures – but not the other two policies – reduced the 
growth rate of cases. Interestingly, the results from the two-part specification suggested that SIPOs 
reduced COVID-19 spread along both the extensive margin (delaying the arrival of the first case 
in the county) and the intensive margin (slower spread once the first case was recorded), whereas 
restaurant/entertainment center closures did so only along the intensive margin. The results from 
the regression using the inverse hyperbolic sine specification showed this more directly, as those 
results were virtually identical to those from the baseline model. 
State Inclusion and Other Miscellaneous Robustness Checks 
Our next group of checks asked whether results were robust to dropping particular, unique 
locations: New York, the hardest-hit state; Washington, the first state to be hit; and California, 
which had the nation’s largest population and earliest shelter-in-place order. Appendix K contains 
the results, which show that dropping any of these states has little impact on the estimates.  
We close with robustness checks related to other miscellaneous issues. First, we estimate 
a more fine-grained event study model that included indicators for each day from 10 days before 
a policy took effect to 20 days after, rather than grouping them into 5-day increments. Appendix 
L Table C.6 displays the results. Not surprisingly, the estimates were less precise than those 
 
dropped. Given these distinctions, it is not obvious to us how one might compute combined marginal effects that 
encompass both parts of the model, so we do not do so.    
13 For further detail, see John B. Burbidge, Lonnie Magee and A. Leslie Robb. “Alternative Transformations to 
Handle Extreme Values of the Dependent Variable.” Journal of the American Statistical Association Vol. 83, No. 
401 (Mar., 1988), pp. 123-127. 
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obtained using 5-day groupings, and the wider confidence intervals generally made the results less 
informative. In particular, we no longer observed significant effects for restaurant/entertainment 
center closures, despite most of the point estimates remaining roughly similar to those obtained 
using the 5-day intervals. The confidence intervals included reductions as large as 8 or more 
percentage points, making the lack of statistical significance uninformative. In contrast, the 
confidence intervals for SIPOs remain smaller, and most of those estimates remain statistically 
significant. One useful result from this check is that the apparent upward pre-treatment trend for 
gathering bans was concentrated among the first half of the pre-treatment window and largely 
disappeared four days before treatment. This increased our confidence that the failure to find a 
causal effect of these bans was not due to confounding from pre-trends. 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
It is important that readers view the results in Figure 5 as a means of illustrating the 
estimated effectiveness of social distancing restrictions at “flattening the curve”, as opposed to 
literal predictions about alternate histories if policymakers had not taken action. Had they not done 
so and COVID-19 had continued to spread in the manner depicted by our simulations, voluntary 
social distancing by individuals and businesses would have likely increased as panic over the rising 
death toll and hospital overcrowding across the country mounted, offsetting some of the additional 
predicted cases. In technical terms, the Census-Division-by-day fixed effects in the later portion 
of the sample period would likely have evolved differently. Regardless, avoiding these startling 
numbers would have required stringent social distancing in one form or another, whether through 
government restrictions or private choices. Economic theory suggests that private choices would 
not likely have slowed the spread as much, as individuals’ prevention efforts have substantial 
benefits to others (positive externalities) that are not factored into their decision-making.  
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Relatedly, testing shortages would likely have prevented official case counts from reaching 
the numbers presented in our counterfactual simulations. However, this is largely a semantic 
distinction, as these infections would still be severe enough to warrant testing in the absence of a 
shortage. If anything, not being confirmed as a COVID-19 case could lead to inadequate treatment.    
As striking as our counterfactual estimates are, they still are not worst-case scenarios because they 
account for at least some voluntary social distancing. Even without any government restrictions, 
Figure 4 illustrated a 14.3 percentage point drop from the peak growth rate to the end of the sample 
period. The most plausible explanation is the responses of individuals and businesses to 
information about the severity of the pandemic and federal guidelines.  
While our results suggest both SIPO and non-SIPO measures can be effective at averting 
COVID-19 cases, the lack of evidence of effects of school closures or bans on large social 
gatherings is noteworthy. We cannot rule out the possibility that these null results are due to 
statistical imprecision, but it is also possible that both policies may displace social interaction 
rather than reducing it. For example, school closures may have led families to continue social 
interactions outside of the school setting, such as at daycare centers or parks. Google mobility data 
through April 5, 2020 show increases of 10 percent or more in visits to parks in 28 states (Google, 
2020). A new study finds that schools are only slightly more dangerous than parks and playgrounds 
for COVID-19 transmission, supporting this explanation (Benzell et al., 2020). Alternatively, 
school closures primarily affect children and the vast majority of children experience mild 
symptoms and therefore may not be included in confirmed cases (Editorial, 2020). While 
asymptomatic children can pass the virus to adults who become more severely ill, our results imply 
that the extent to which this led to confirmed cases did not change when schools were closed.  
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Similarly, official group events may have simply been replaced by informal gatherings. 
Alternatively, official prohibitions may have been largely redundant since the largest events (such 
as college and professional sports) were already being cancelled due to CDC guidance or other 
information. Also note that school closures and large event bans occurred prior to the 
implementation of SIPOs, meaning substitute types of social gatherings were still allowed. Our 
results, therefore, should not be interpreted as a forecast about what would happen if schools were 
reopened or certain large gatherings were allowed while other aspects of SIPOs remained in place. 
Limitations 
There were several limitations to our analysis. Official COVID-19 case counts are known 
to understate the true prevalence of the disease, as they do not include asymptomatic carriers, those 
who are not ill enough to seek medical care, and those who are unable to obtain a test due to supply 
constraints (Friedson et al, 2020). Nonetheless, confirmed case counts are crucial to the Trump 
administration’s “Opening Up America Again” plan, which proposed a “downward trajectory of 
documented cases within a 14-day period” or “downward trajectory of positive tests as a percent 
of total tests within a 14-day period (flat or increasing volume of tests)” as criteria to loosening 
social distancing measures (The White House, 2020). Moreover, to the extent that testing shortages 
led to only the sickest individuals receiving them, official case counts can loosely be interpreted 
as the prevalence of moderate-to-severe illnesses, a relevant metric for policy purposes. 
A related caveat is that, ideally, we would like to be able to control more precisely for 
access to testing. Available data only allowed us to control for the number of tests performed at 
the state, rather than the county level. However, most of our policy variation is at the state level, 
so state-level testing should go a long way towards alleviating bias. Additionally, the number of 
tests performed depends not only on their availability but also the level of illness in the community, 
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making it endogenous. Our estimated policy effects remain virtually identical if we drop the testing 
variables (see appendix), providing reassurance that this limitation did not meaningfully affect our 
conclusions. 
Also, we might ideally want to estimate a richer econometric model. It would be interesting 
to trace out the timing of impacts more exactly, study the policies’ interactions with each other or 
county characteristics, and examine the impacts of other social distancing policies such as closing 
public parks and beaches, the requirement to wear masks in public, restrictions on visitors in 
nursing homes, informal state announcements of first cases or fatalities, and federal government 
actions such as prohibiting international travel (Gupta et al., 2020). However, it is difficult to 
include numerous correlated treatment variables without reducing precision to the point where 
statistical inference is uninformative. A robustness check in the appendix illustrates this by 
showing that the estimates generally become much less precise than the ones we report below if 
we include separate indicators for each day from 10 days before treatment to 20 days after. One 
could ask if even our five-day windows were too demanding of the available policy variation, but 
other appendix robustness checks show that simpler specifications do not reveal new insights.  
Finally, as is typical of observational data analyses, we cannot rule out all possible threats 
to causal inference. Numerous possible confounders could vary across time and space, including 
the other policies mentioned above, informal encouragement by government officials to wear 
masks or improve hygiene, changing business practices, and social norms regarding distancing. 
That said, including Census-Division-by-day and county fixed effects in our model and examining 
pretreatment trends helped us to push in the direction of causality. We show in the appendix that 
the results were robust to the inclusion of county-specific pre-treatment trends, further supporting 




We estimated the separate and combined impact of four widely adopted social distancing 
policies. Both SIPOs and closures of restaurants/bars/entertainment-related businesses 
substantially slowed the spread of COVID-19. We did not find evidence that bans on large events 
and closures of public schools also did, though the confidence intervals cannot rule out moderately 
sized effects. Two recent papers on the effect of the same government social distancing restrictions 
on mobility found the same pattern of results, suggesting a plausible mechanism (Abouk and 
Heydari, 2020; Andersen, 2020). 
Our contribution was to provide credible empirical evidence on whether US social 
distancing measures worked as intended in flattening the curve. Estimating other important 
benefits and costs from social distancing, including the total lives saved and economic harm, was 
beyond the scope of our study. Other work has attempted to estimate job losses, simulate effects 
on the overall economy and economic growth, or estimate distributional consequences from 
current and past pandemics (Friedson et al., 2020; Thunstrom et al., 2020; Scherbina, 2020; Hall 
et al, 2020l Greenstone and Vishan, 2020; Correia et al., 2020). 
Nonetheless, we provided important information about the benefits of social distancing for 
policymakers to consider as they decide on strategies for restarting economic activity. For instance, 
our results suggest that returning to partial measures such as school closures and restrictions on 
large gatherings, while removing the restrictions that prevent the redirection of social activity to 
other settings, would be ineffective in curbing the spread of the virus. At issue moving forward is 
whether cases averted simply turn into cases delayed, and a premature return to light measures 




APPENDIX A  
TABLE A1: CROSS-STATE EVENT STUDY - COUNT OF ENTRIES PER 100K STATE 
POPULATION 
Variables All Doctors Primary Care Other Specialties 
Ever Expanded x 2011 0.0200 -0.0317 0.0365 
 (0.2165) (0.1206) (0.1097) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2012 -0.0047 0.0219 -0.0274 
 (0.1626) (0.0865) (0.0926) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2014 -0.0639 -0.0905 -0.0422 
 (0.1084) (0.0887) (0.0625) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2015 -0.2598 -0.0979 -0.1780+ 
 (0.2555) (0.1455) (0.1054) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2016 -0.2280 -0.1772 -0.0800 
 (0.3076) (0.1857) (0.1320) 
    
State FE x x x 
Year FE x x x 
Observations 240 240 240 
Standard errors in parentheses    














APPENDIX B  
TABLE A2: 5, 10, AND 20 MILE RADII 
5 MILE RADIUS 
Variables All Docs (5 mi.) Primary Care (5 mi.) Other. Spec. (5 mi.) 
Ever Expanded x 2011 1.6806 4.6303 -0.3015 
 (2.8880) (3.8421) (4.4893) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2012 -0.0858 3.2931 -2.4525 
 (1.6811) (3.9219) (2.3592) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2014 7.3972** 5.8144 8.7365* 
 (2.6298) (5.2654) (3.4214) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2015 9.9623** 11.0290 9.7751* 
 (3.6631) (7.2478) (4.3225) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2016 16.0180** 15.1352+ 16.6085** 
 (5.7948) (8.7538) (5.9260) 
    
Year FE  x x 
State FE  x x 
Year x Doctor Type FE x   
State x Doctor Type FE x   
Observations 30243 12353 17890 
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10 MILE RADIUS 
Variables All Docs (10 mi.) Primary Care (10 mi.) Other. Spec. (10 mi.) 
Ever Expanded x 2011 1.4864 1.8702 1.2702 
 (1.8002) (4.1620) (2.6823) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2012 -0.6244 -0.7464 -0.7631 
 (1.3824) (3.4513) (1.7984) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2014 3.3059 -0.9717 6.2627** 
 (2.0864) (4.2267) (1.8855) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2015 3.6282 1.2990 5.3685+ 
 (2.5247) (4.8459) (2.8503) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2016 5.6478 1.1541 8.5811* 
 (3.5751) (5.4068) (3.3689) 
    
Year FE  x x 
State FE  x x 
Year x Doctor Type FE x   
State x Doctor Type FE x   
Observations 30254 12360 17894 
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20 MILE RADIUS 
Variables All Docs (20 mi.) Primary Care (20 mi.) Other. Spec. (20 mi.) 
Ever Expanded x 2011 1.3386 -1.6270 3.2467 
 (2.2221) (3.1000) (2.2520) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2012 0.0424 0.4133 -0.2586 
 (1.8196) (2.5933) (1.6895) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2014 1.9127 0.1213 3.2514+ 
 (2.2648) (3.6750) (1.7011) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2015 2.7150 2.7372 2.9532 
 (2.4834) (3.3404) (2.4928) 
    
Ever Expanded x 2016 3.7445 2.2655 5.1846+ 
 (3.1365) (4.0849) (3.0323) 
    
Year FE  x x 
State FE  x x 
Year x Doctor Type FE x   
State x Doctor Type FE x   
Observations 30255 12361 17894 












FIGURE B1: MAP OF THE 1947 INTERSTATE HIGHWAY PLAN 
 
Sprawl Index Factor Construction 
The density factor is constructed from measures of gross density of urban and suburban 
census tracts, percentages of populations living in low suburban densities and in medium to high 
urban densities, urban density based on the National Land Cover Database, and a gross density 
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variable similar to the first but derived from data from the Local Employment Database (LED)14. 
The use of the LED means that Massachusetts is excluded from the index as data for that state was 
not obtained in the LED. Thus, any conclusion drawn from these measures of sprawl cannot 
necessarily be generalized to MSAs in Massachusetts.  
The mixed-use factor is calculated from three variables: geography-wide, average job-
population balance, geography wide degree of job mixing, and a geography-wide, average Walk 
Score. The first two were calculated at the census block group level using the 2010 Census and 
LED data at the block level. The first examines the relative ratio of jobs to residents within a given 
radius. The second looks at variation in job types by industry in a similar fashion. The third was 
calculated from Walk Score, Inc. data and measures the proximity to various amenities and how 
accessible they are on foot. Finer detail on the calculations of these variables can be found in the 
cited report; though these details are for the county level calculation, the same principles were 
applied to MSAs15.  
The urban centering factor provides a measure of economic and population centeredness 
within metropolitan areas. In their words “urban centers are concentrations of activity that provide 
agglomeration economies, support alternative modes and multipurpose trip making, create a sense 
of place in the urban landscape, and otherwise, differentiate compact urban areas from sprawling 
ones.”16 The variables constructing the centering measure are variation in population density, 
variation in employment density17, percentage of the population in the central business district or 
 
14 Ewing R. and Hamidi S., “Measuring Sprawl and Validating Sprawl Measures”, Report Prepared for the NCI, 
NIH, Ford Foundation, and Smart Growth America, (2014) p. 12. Available at https://gis.cancer.gov/tools/urban-
sprawl/, last accessed 9/25/2018 
15 Ewing and Hamidi, Op. Cit. p. 13-14.  
16 Ewing and Hamidi, Op. Cit. p. 14. 
17 Greater variation around the mean is taken to imply greater centering. 
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economic sub-centers, and percentage of employment in the central business district or sub-
centers. 
The street accessibility factor is comprised of measures of the average block size 
(excluding rural blocks larger than a square mile), percentage of small urban blocks (less than 
1/100 if a mile in size), intersection density, and percentage of four or more-way intersections. 
These variables are calculated with the use of TomTom GPS data.18 Again, finer detail on the 
calculation of these variables and factors can be found in the already cited report. The street factor 
















FIGURE C1: NUMBER OF U.S. COUNTIES WITH CONFIRMED CASES 
Diffusion of COVID-19 during Sample Period 
Appendix Figure C.1 below shows the growth in the number of counties with confirmed 
COVID-19 cases during our sample period of March 1 through April 27, 2020. These are simple 
counts, not adjusted for population. 0.4% of counties had a COVID-19 case on 3/1, but 11% of the 
US population lived in those counties. Similarly, more than half of US residents lived in counties 
with a case by March 13, even though just 9% of counties had a case. By April 1, 97% of residents 
lived in counties with a case, compared to 71% of the unadjusted number of counties. 
 
Note: All cases for Bronx, Kings, Queens, and Richmond counties in NY were lumped into New 

































TABLE C1: EFFECTIVE DATES OF STATE SOCIAL DISTANCING MEASURES 
State Shelter in Place No Gatherings of 500+ Public Schools Closed Rest./ Ent./Gym Order 
AL 4/4 3/13 3/16 3/19 
AK 3/28 3/24 3/19 3/17 
AZ 3/31 3/17 3/16 3/17 
AR  3/26 3/17 3/19 
CA 3/19 3/19 3/19 3/15 
CO 3/26 3/13 3/23 3/17 
CT 3/23 3/23 3/17 3/16 
DE 3/24 3/24 3/16 3/12 
DC 4/1 3/25 3/16 3/16 
FL 4/3 3/17 3/16 3/20 
GA 4/3 3/17 3/18 3/20 
HI 3/25 3/25 3/23 3/20 
ID 3/25 3/25 3/23 3/23 
IL 3/21 3/18 3/17 3/18 
IN 3/25 3/13 3/19 3/17 
IA  3/17 4/2 3/17 
KS 3/30 3/17 3/18 3/24 
KY 3/26 3/20 3/16 3/16 
LA 3/23 3/17 3/16 3/17 
ME 4/2 3/18 3/15 3/18 
MD 3/30 3/13 3/16 3/16 
MA 3/24 3/17 3/17 3/17 
MI 3/24 3/24 3/16 3/16 
MN 3/28 3/27 3/18 3/17 
MS 4/3 3/25 3/20 3/25 
MO 4/6 3/21 3/19 3/21 
MT 3/28 3/28 3/16 3/20 
NE  3/19 3/19 4/4 
NV 4/1 3/24 3/16 3/20 
NH 3/28 3/24 3/16 3/16 
NJ 3/21 3/16 3/18 3/16 
NM 3/24 3/18 3/16 3/18 
NY 3/22 3/13 3/18 3/16 
NC 3/30 3/12 3/16 3/17 
ND   3/16 3/19 
OH 3/24 3/15 3/17 3/15 
OK  3/29 3/17 4/1 
OR 3/23 3/16 3/16 3/17 
PA 4/1 3/23 3/16 3/17 
RI 3/28 3/16 3/16 3/23 
SC 4/7 3/18 3/16 3/18 
SD   3/16 3/23 
TN 4/1 3/25 3/20 3/23 
TX 4/2 3/14 3/23 3/19 
UT  3/12 3/16 3/18 
VT 3/25 3/25 3/18 3/17 
VA 3/30 3/24 3/16 3/16 
WA 3/23 3/11 3/17 3/17 
WV 3/24 3/24 3/16 3/24 
WI 3/25 3/17 3/18 3/17 
WY  3/20 3/20 3/19 
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Adjustments for Likely Data Errors 
The original county-by-day cases data contained some likely reporting errors. First, the 
COVID-19 case counts on Sunday, March 15, 2020 were identical to those from March 14, 2020 
in all large counties that had cases at the time, even though substantial growth was reported on 
March 16, 2020. This is almost certainly due to lack of reporting on that particular Sunday rather 
than a true lack of new cases. We therefore imputed the cases for March 15, 2020 so that growth 
from March 14, 2020 to March 16, 2020 was evenly split between the two days.  
Additionally, 964 of the 182,004 county-by-day observations reported a reduction in 
cases from the previous day, which is implausible since case counts were cumulative. 
Approximately half of these were cases where the count increased by one on one day and then 
decreased by one the next. In such cases, the original increase was likely an error (e.g. presumed 
case that was later found to be negative, duplicate, or person who lived in a different 
county/state), so we removed the initial increase so that the case count remained constant over 
the three days. We set remaining instances of negative growth rates to zero. As shown later in 
this appendix, our results were virtually unchanged if we simply dropped observations with case 
reductions as well as all observations on March 15, 2020. 
We also corrected some apparent errors in the social distancing policy dates. Many 
Kansas counties had reported dates for gathering bans that were after the date for the statewide 
ban, so we changed those dates to match the statewide ban.19 We removed the reported SIPO in 
Wyoming, which was listed as March 28, 2020, as sources such as the Kaiser Family 
 
19 The counties were Allen, Anderson, Atchison, Barber, Barton, Bourbon, Brown, Butler, Chase, Chautauqua, 




Foundation20 as well as various news articles21 listed the state as not having any SIPO in place 
after the date listed. Some school closing dates also appeared incorrect. School closing dates 
were checked against those listed at edweek.org22. If there was more than a day mismatch, then a 
third source was found to decide the date used, leading to changes for Alabama23, Alaska24, 
Iowa25, and Wyoming26. We changed the SIPO start date for MS27 and the gathering ban date for 
KY28 as they were incorrect in the source data. The SIPOs for IN, MN, NH, OH, and TN had an 
effective start time of 11:59 pm. We changed the start day for these states to the following day as 
they were in effect for only one minute on their actual start date. Appendix Tables 2 and 3 below 











22 See: https://www.edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/map-coronavirus-and-school-closures.html 







27 See: https://www.sos.ms.gov/Content/documents/ed_pubs/Exec%20Orders/1466.pdf 




TABLE C2: EFFECTIVE DATES OF COUNTY SOCIAL DISTANCING MEASURES 
State County Date Issued State County Date Issued 
AL Jefferson 3/26 MO Randolph 3/25 
AK Anchorage 3/22 MO Ray 3/25 
CO Adams 3/24 MO St. Louis 3/23 
CO Arapahoe 3/24 PA Allegheny 3/23 
CO Archuleta 3/24 PA Beaver 3/28 
CO Boulder 3/24 PA Berks 3/27 
CO Denver 3/24 PA Bucks 3/23 
CO Douglas 3/24 PA Butler 3/27 
CO Eagle 3/24 PA Centre 3/28 
CO Grand 3/24 PA Chester 3/23 
CO Jefferson 3/24 PA Delaware 3/23 
CO La Plata 3/24 PA Erie 3/24 
CO Pitkin 3/24 PA Lackawanna 3/27 
CO San Miguel 3/24 PA Lancaster 3/27 
FL Alachua 3/25 PA Lehigh 3/25 
FL Broward 3/27 PA Luzerne 3/27 
FL Duval 3/25 PA Monroe 3/23 
FL Hillsborough 3/27 PA Montgomery 3/23 
FL Leon 3/25 PA Northampton 3/25 
FL Miami-Dade 3/25 PA Philadelphia 3/23 
FL Monroe 3/30 PA Pike 3/27 
FL Orange 3/26 PA Washington 3/28 
FL Osceola 3/26 PA Wayne 3/27 
FL Palm Beach 3/30 PA Westmoreland 3/27 
FL Pinellas 3/26 PA York 3/27 
GA Chatham 3/24 TN Davidson 3/25 
GA Dougherty 3/21 TN Franklin 3/25 
GA Fulton 3/24 TX Austin 3/24 
KS Johnson 3/24 TX Bell 3/24 
KS Leavenworth 3/24 TX Bexar 3/24 
KS Sedgwick 3/25 TX Brazos 3/24 
KS Wyandotte 3/24 TX Collin 3/24 
MS Lafayette 3/22 TX Dallas 3/23 
MS Lauderdale 3/31 TX El Paso 3/24 
MO Boone 3/25 TX Fort Bend 3/24 
MO Cass 3/24 TX Galveston 3/24 
MO Clay 3/24 TX Harris 3/24 
MO Cole 3/23 TX McLennan 3/24 
MO Greene 3/26 TX Tarrant 3/24 
MO Jackson 3/24 UT Salt Lake 3/30 
MO Jefferson 3/24 UT Summit 3/27 




TABLE C3: ESTIMATED EFFECT OF SOCIAL DISTANCING POLICIES ON THE 
GROWTH RATE OF COVID-19 CASES IN MODELS WITH A SINGLE VARIABLE 
FOR EACH POLICY 
 10-Day Lag 20-Day Lag 
Shelter-in-Place Order in Effect -3.997 (0.705)* -4.106 (0.631)* 
Restaurant/Gym/Entertainment Closures -2.417 (0.726)* -1.951 (0.797)* 
No Large Events -0.486 (1.020) -0.953 (1.136) 
Public Schools Closed  1.705 (1.062) 0.168 (0.903) 
Notes: Sample size = 182,004 county-by-day observations. * indicates statistically significant at the 5% level; + 10% 
level. Standard errors, in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. Observations are 
weighted by county population. Regressions include the growth rate in cumulative tests in each of the past two days 























TABLE C4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS RELATED TO DIFFERENT WAYS OF 












Shelter-in-Place Order      
1-5 Days Ago -1.514 -1.643 -1.641 -1.639 -1.633 
6-10 Days Ago -3.033* -3.229* -3.098* -3.165* -3.131* 
11-15 Days Ago -4.482* -4.671* -4.530* -4.658* -4.630* 
16-20 Days Ago -5.950* -6.155* -5.977* -6.132* -6.104* 
21 or More Days Ago  -8.600* -8.905* -8.564* -8.821* -8.781* 
      
Restaurant/Gym/Entertainment Closures    
1-5 Days Ago -4.372* -4.415* -4.349* -4.500* -4.335* 
6-10 Days Ago -4.710* -4.805* -4.751* -4.878* -4.713* 
11-15 Days Ago -6.125* -6.151* -6.088* -6.293* -6.031* 
16-20 Days Ago -5.594* -5.595* -5.588* -5.861* -5.539* 
21 or More Days Ago -5.177* -5.149* -5.156* -5.500* -5.135* 
      
No Large Events      
1-5 Days Ago 0.172 0.264 0.258 0.260 0.227 
6-10 Days Ago -0.061 0.033 0.130 -0.010 0.125 
11-15 Days Ago 0.013 0.055 0.144 -0.053 0.109 
16 or More Days Ago -1.041 -1.039 -0.888 -1.140 -0.933 
21 or More Days Ago -1.272 -1.269 -1.127 -1.404 -1.164 
      
Public Schools Closed      
1-5 Days Ago 0.304 0.170 0.002 0.298 0.109 
6-10 Days Ago 1.004 0.928 0.683 1.149 0.864 
11-15 Days Ago 2.443 2.406 2.157 2.751 2.432 
16 or More Days Ago 3.465 3.475 3.179 3.868 3.505 
21 or More Days Ago 3.095 3.173 2.812 3.591 3.232 
      
Testing Variable for Day t 0.010+ 0.291* 0.005* 1.235* -- 
Testing Variable for Day t-
1 0.012* -0.064 0.005* -0.676 -- 































Shelter-in-Place Order       
1-5 Days Ago -1.144 -0.783 -0.994 -0.024* -1.045 -1.844 
6-10 Days Ago -2.332* -1.736* -2.028* -0.059* -2.117* -3.456* 
11-15 Days Ago -3.412* -2.652* -2.929* -0.090* -2.898* -4.794* 
16-20 Days Ago -4.517* -3.626* -3.847* -0.112* -3.666* -6.052* 
21 or More Days Ago  -6.541* -5.480* -5.536* -0.143* -5.239* -8.727* 
       
Restaurant/Gym/Entertainment Closures     
1-5 Days Ago -4.060* -5.779* -3.936+ 0.011 -6.778* -4.821* 
6-10 Days Ago -4.164+ -6.406* -3.952+ 0.002 -6.242* -5.123* 
11-15 Days Ago -5.372* -8.016* -5.081* 0.010 -8.085* -6.556* 
16-20 Days Ago -4.648+ -7.825* -4.302+ 0.027 -7.694* -5.997* 
21 or More Days Ago -4.067+ -7.849* -3.683 0.046 -7.549* -5.556* 
       
No Large Events       
1-5 Days Ago 0.176 0.528 0.213 0.028 -1.713 0.007 
6-10 Days Ago -0.082 0.185 -0.011 0.036 -2.107 -0.509 
11-15 Days Ago -0.012 0.553 0.089 0.035 -2.300 -0.302 
16-20 Days Ago -1.077 -0.317 -0.941 0.033 -3.802 -1.414 
21 or More Days Ago -1.349 -0.300 -1.177 0.030 -4.260 -1.568 
       
Public Schools Closed       
1-5 Days Ago -0.070 0.260 -0.188 -0.062 1.909 1.033 
6-10 Days Ago 0.231 0.334 -0.0004 -0.085 2.656 2.153 
11-15 Days Ago 1.335 1.137 1.025 -0.095 3.390 3.956 
16-20 Days Ago 2.090 1.786 1.732 -0.107 3.851 5.160 
21 or More Days Ago 1.495 1.038 1.116 -0.115 2.774 5.032 
       
Sample Size 229,074 138,072 298,110 298,110 93,245 182,004 








TABLE C6: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS DROPPING STATES 
 
 
Drop NY Drop WA Drop CA 
Shelter-in-Place Order    
1-5 Days Ago -1.320 -1.564 -1.475 
6-10 Days Ago -2.853* -2.987* -2.770* 
11-15 Days Ago -4.248* -4.616* -4.531* 
16-20 Days Ago -5.681* -6.069* -5.940* 
21 or More Days Ago  -8.336* -8.776* -8.523* 
    
Restaurant/Gym/Entertainment Closures  
1-5 Days Ago -4.691* -4.991* -5.068* 
6-10 Days Ago -5.189* -5.293* -5.220* 
11-15 Days Ago -6.645* -6.621* -6.430* 
16-20 Days Ago -6.313* -6.271* -6.111* 
21 or More Days Ago -5.947* -5.875* -5.603* 
    
No Large Events    
1-5 Days Ago -0.051 0.483 0.609 
6-10 Days Ago -0.414 0.723 0.719 
11-15 Days Ago 0.354 0.850 0.700 
16 or More Days Ago -0.388 -0.004 -0.239 
21 or More Days Ago -0.230 -0.050 -0.356 
    
Public Schools Closed    
1-5 Days Ago 0.923 0.644 0.521 
6-10 Days Ago 1.285 2.084 2.368 
11-15 Days Ago 2.500 3.614 3.445 
16 or More Days Ago 3.442 4.851 4.697 
21 or More Days Ago 2.808 4.665 4.398 
    
Sample Size 178,640 179,742 178,640 
































Shelter-in-Place Order      
1-5 Days Ago -1.733 -1.393 -1.402 -2.361* -1.525 
6-10 Days Ago -3.189* -2.800* -2.912* -4.176* -3.038* 
11-15 Days Ago -4.732* -4.302* -4.333* -5.867* -4.461* 
16-20 Days Ago -6.262* -5.780* -5.775* -7.47* -5.888* 
21 or More Days Ago  -8.871* -8.351* -8.383* -10.414* -8.438* 
      
Restaurant/Gym/Entertainment Closures    
1-5 Days Ago -4.581* -3.797* -4.144* -3.218+ -4.407* 
6-10 Days Ago -4.905* -3.068 -4.427+ -5.351* -4.762* 
11-15 Days Ago -6.612* -4.642* -5.740* -6.575* -6.186* 
16-20 Days Ago -6.330* -3.988 -5.159+ -7.109* -5.656* 
21 or More Days Ago -5.970* -3.357 -4.666+ -7.092* -5.221* 
      
No Large Events      
1-5 Days Ago 1.971 -0.046 0.188 0.208 0.172 
6-10 Days Ago 1.333 -0.787 -0.073 0.488 -0.055 
11-15 Days Ago 1.451 -0.684 -0.008 0.643 0.030 
16 or More Days Ago 1.085 -1.602 -1.064 -0.358 -1.012 
21 or More Days Ago 0.280 -1.800 -1.316 -0.191 -1.218 
      
Public Schools Closed      
1-5 Days Ago 0.649 0.080 0.315 3.207 0.356 
6-10 Days Ago 1.921 0.736 0.933 1.717 1.092 
11-15 Days Ago 3.521 2.151 2.367 1.396 2.544 
16 or More Days Ago 4.882 3.244 3.335 0.641 3.567 
21 or More Days Ago 4.798 2.881 2.933 -0.030 3.176 
      
Sample Size 182,004 182,004 182,004 182,004 182,004 








Creation of Counterfactuals in Figures 11 and 12 
In Figure 11, we plot the daily growth rate of COVID-19 cases in the U.S. under three 
scenarios. The first is actual case growth rates, which reflect the presence of all four social 
distancing measures when and where they were implemented. The second is counterfactual growth 
rates when we assume no jurisdictions ever implemented a SIPO but did implement the other 
measures the same way they did in reality. Formally, this is done by subtracting out the effect of 
SIPOs from the actual growth rate so that 




The third is the counterfactual when we assume no jurisdictions ever implemented any social 
distancing restriction: 
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙2𝑐𝑑













Note that we do not also subtract out the “placebo” effects of the future policy implementation 
variables, since those are intended to capture unobserved confounders rather than part of the causal 
effect of the policies. After obtaining the counterfactuals, we aggregate all three growth rate 




Figure 12 builds on Figure 11 to predict the number of cases under each counterfactual scenario. 
Note that ln (𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑) − ln(𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1) = ln (
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1
) implies that  




With a predicted growth rate, ln (
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1
)̂ , this becomes 
 





]exp( 𝑐𝑑)̂ , (A1) 
 
where exp( 𝑐𝑑)̂  is the average of exp( 𝑐?̂?) in the estimation sample.
29 
Therefore, predicting the number of cases under each scenario requires the estimated 
residual from our regression and predicted values of ln (
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑
𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑑−1
) under the counterfactuals 
discussed above. Each of these estimates is then plugged into equation (A1) to predict 
counterfactual cases in county/day observations following the start date of a relevant policy. Prior 
to a policy beginning in a given county, the “counterfactual” cases are no different from the 
observed cases. Once the number of cases is predicted in each period under a given counterfactual, 
we sum the observed and predicted cases by day to create nation-by-day totals for observed and 
counterfactual cases. When these sums are presented on a logarithmic scale, as they are in Figure 
12, the natural log must be calculated again after summing each variable. 
 
29 Don M. Miller (1984) Reducing Transformation Bias in Curve Fitting, The American Statistician, 38:2, 124-
126, DOI: 10.1080/00031305.1984.10483180 
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This calculation is subject to several technical caveats that together mean the results should 
be interpreted as rough approximations rather than exact numbers. There is always uncertainly 
with calculations based on underlying parameters that are estimated, and it is difficult to accurately 
quantify the amount of this uncertainty. In this particular calculation, errors can compound over 
time, as 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑−1̂  in equation (A1) is itself an estimate. Even when 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑̂  is predicted from 
observed policies and using observed cases in 𝑑 − 1, the predicted value is larger than 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑑 on 
average in our sample. Additionally, the average difference is always positive later in the sample. 
To err on the side of caution and avoid having these errors accumulate over time, we discount our 
counterfactual predictions based on the average ratio of observed to predicted cases whenever the 
predicted cases (based on observed policies) are greater than observed cases on average.  
We also err on the side of caution in one other way. When calculating the predicted case 
counts for each counterfactual, we set the coefficient on the variables indicating a policy start date 
21 or more days in the past (𝑖 = 5 in the summation above) equal to the corresponding coefficient 
for 16-20 days. As discussed above and in the manuscript, our sample period includes up to 20 
days after each policy. This means there is geographic balance for the variables reflecting up to 20 
days, enabling apples-to-apples comparisons. However, the comparability of the estimates for the 
21-or-more-day indicators is less clear, as earlier SIPOs remain in that category longer than more 
recent SIPOs. It is therefore not clear that the additional effect of SIPOs observed after 21+ days 
relative to 16-20 days is a “true” increase as opposed to simply the artifact of the compositional 
changes. We therefore make the conservative assumption that the true effect peaked and remained 
constant after 16 days. Without this adjustment, the estimated cases with no social distancing 
policies rise from ~35 million to ~50 million. 
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An assumption that pushes in the direction of overstatement is that the pool of potentially 
infectable individuals is fixed over time. This ignores immunity from fighting off the virus. By the 
end of the sample period, with nearly a tenth of the US population predicted to have been sick 
enough to reach the threshold for a confirmed case, this assumption may not be benign. However, 
debate continues over the extent to which exposure to the virus conveys immunity, so the exact 
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